Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1987

Authoritarianism and Political Socialization in Voluntary
Organizations: The Case of Koreans in the Chicago Area
Yoon M. Lee
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Anthropology Commons

Recommended Citation
Lee, Yoon M., "Authoritarianism and Political Socialization in Voluntary Organizations: The Case of
Koreans in the Chicago Area" (1987). Dissertations. 3136.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3136

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1987 Yoon M. Lee

AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS:
THE CASE OF KOREANS IN THE CHICAGO AREA

by
Yoon M. Lee

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
May

1987

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to his dissertation committee members who have taken the painstaking efforts in
bringing this research into a final product.

The author expresses

his special gratitude to Dr. Ross P. Scherer, who introduced him to
the concept of the Western voluntarism and also served twice as the
chairman for the author's academic endeavors, once for his Master's
thesis and now his Doctoral dissertation.
While participating in courses with Drs. Lauren Langman and
Joseph Galaskiewicz, the author was enlightened with the concept of
authoritarianism and pluralistic political perspectives.

Since then

he has struggled to find an academic formula for a democratic solution to his homeland suffering under authoritarian dictatorship.
Dr. Alan Gitelson added his insights in political science and Dr.
Kenneth Johnson advised with his methodological skills.
Fr. Thomas Gannon,S.J. and Dr. Jay P. Ryu who opened the doors
to graduate studies in sociology for the author, Dr. Kathelen McCourt
(who assisted with the author's Masters thesis), Dr. Kirsten Gronbjerg
(who constantly encouraged the author to "get it over with") also deserve the author's deep gratitude.
The author is grateful to the Korea Times of Chicago and its subscribers for their support in data collection and to Mr. Gordon Moon
(fomer NATO press officer) who helped proof-reading the whole text of
this manuscript.

Above all, the author is permanently indebted to Hwa

S. Lee, his wife and two daughters, Sherline and Deborah for their
painful endurance and support for the author.
ii

VITA
The author, Yoon M. Lee is the son of Chang H. Lee and the late
Hyun Sook(Cho) Lee. He was born June 15, 1939, in Korea.
His elementary and secondary schoolings were obtained in the
public schools of Won-ju, Korea and was graduated from Paichai High
school in Seoul, Korea in 1957.
In March of 1957, he entered Seoul National University, receiving a Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Science in February, 1961.
After military service in Korea, he completed his education in religion
at the Seoul Methodist Seminary in December, 1966. He briefly joined
church ministry, then came to the United States in August, 1970, to
attend the Asbury Theological Seminary, in Wilmore, Kentucky, where he
completed a Master of Theology program in pastoral psychology.
In January, 1973, he was admitted to the Graduate School of
Loyola University of Chicago and earned the Master of Arts degree in
sociology in May, 1978.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

............................................ ii
........................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
VITA

vi

LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES

............................................

CONTENTS OF APPENDICES

viii
ix

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem

1

...................... ...........•.

1

B. Korean Political Culture
•.••••••••••••••••••••••
C. Theoretical Aims of the Research
.••••••••••••••••

3
7

D. Plan of Presentation

•....•.....•.................

8

.................................

10

................................

19

III. THEORETICAL DESIGN AND DATA ••••••••.••••••.•••.•••••••

24

II.

REV~EW

OF LITERATURE

A. Pluralism
B. Authoritarianism

A. Postulates and Hypotheses

•••••••••••••••••••••••••

B. Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN AMERICANS

10

24
25
27
31

A. Historical Background of Korean Immigrants
B. Demographic Description of Korean-Americans

31
35

V. AUTHORITARIANISM, ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND
POLITICAL EFFICACY

44

A. Authoritarianism

.................................

B. Participation in Voluntary Organization
C. Political Efficacy

, ..•.•.••.•

.............................. .

44
48
51

D. Authoritarianism, Organizational Participation, and
Political Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

60

.........

75

A. Political Participation . • • . • . • • • • . • . • . . • • • • • • • • • • .
B. Political Issue Preference •••••••••.•••.••••••••••

75
85

VI. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE PREFERENCE

VII.

DISCUSSION

.......................................... 100

A. General Findings About Authoritarianism and Its
Political Implication
•••.••.•.••..••••.•••.••..•• 100
B. Political Culture in Transition
••••••••••••••.••• 103
C. Adaptation and Political Integration
.•••••••.••.• 112
VIII.

CONCLUSION

.......................................... 122

A. Summary of the Findings
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 122
B. Comments on the Method and Data .••••.•••.•.••.•..• 126
C. Theoretical Implication and Suggestions for
Further Research

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

BIBLIOGRAPHY

132

APPENDICES

146

v

LIST OF TABLES
Page

Table
IV. 1. Number of Immigrants to the U.S.

34

IV. 2. Age Distribution of Koreans

37

IV. 3. Age by Sex(Current Sample)

37

IV. 4. Educational Attainment of the Respondents

.........

IV. 5. Educational Attainment of Koreans in Illinois

............
...................

38
39

IV. 6. Occupational Status of the Respondents

40

IV. 7. Respondents' Occupation by Sex

41
42

IV. 8. Income Status of the Respondents

..............

45

V. 2. Correlation Among Six Authoritarian Items..........

46

V. 3. Organization Membership

49

V. 4. Organization Office Holders

49

V. 5. Organization Participation

50

V. 6. Affiliation by Types of Organizations

50

V. 7. Confidence in the U.S. Political System............

53

.............

54

V. 1. Responses to Six Authoritarian Items

V. 8. Civic Affect (Sense of Citizens Duty)
V. 9. Input Affect A (Actions to be Taken)

56

V.10. Input Affect B (possibility of Success)

57

V.11. Output Affect (Equal Treatment from Authorities)

58

V.12. Output Affect (Expectations to-ward Officials)

59

V.13. Organizational Index and Political Affect

61

V.14. Authoritarianism and System Affect

62

V.15. Organization Involvement and System Affect ••••••.••

63

vi

V.16. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect

64

V.17. Organizational Membership and Civic Affect

64

V.18. Authoritarianism and Input Affect

.................

V.19. Organizational Membership and Input Affect
V.20. Authoritarianism and Output Affect

................

66
66

67

V.21. Organizational Membership and Output Affect

67

VI. 1. Political Participation of Korean Americans

76

VI. 2. Profiles of Voters in Elections

77

VI. 3. Authoritarianism, Political Affect, and Voting

78

VI. 4. Authoritarianism, Organizational Involvement,
Political Affect, and Voting
•••••••••••••••••••••

80

VI. 5. Responses to Protest Items

82

VI. 6. Protest Approval by Authoritarianism

83

VI. 7. Protest Approval by Authoritarianism and
Political Affect

.................................

84

VI. 8. Issue Preference in Political Discussion

86

VI. 9. Political Issue Preference by Citizenship

86

VI.10. Government Policy Preference

86

VI.11. Authoritarianism, Political Affect,
and Issue Preference
.............................

88

VI.12. Authoritarianism and Liberal-Conservative Issues

91

VI.13. Political Affect and Liberal/Conservative
Political Issue Index

. ...........................

93

VII. 1. Authoritarianism and Types of Political
Orientation

.....................................

106

VII. 2. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Civic
Identification

..................................

115

VII. 3. Years in the U.S. and Political Issue Preference ••• 116
VII. 4. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Voting
vii

118

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
V. 1. Authoritarianism and Political Affect

61

V. 2. Summary: Authoritarianism, Organizational
Involvement, and Political Affects
••••••••••••••••

70

V.3a. Organizational Involvement and System Affect
V.3b. Organizational Involvement and Civic Affect
V.3c. Organizational Involvement and Input Affect
V.3d. Organizational Involvement and Output Affect

.......
.......
.......
.......

73
73
74
74

VI. 1. Major Variables and Political Issue Preferences

87

VI. 2. Profiles of the Protest Prone Authoritarians

95

VII. 1. Types of Political Culture and Political Actors

104

VII. 2. Mobilized Voting Model

108

VII. 3. Democratic Citizenship Model

108

VII. 4. Transitional Citizenship Model

109

VII. 5. Critical Phases in Adaptation Process ••••••••••••••••

113

VII. 6. Transition of Civic Identification

114

VII. 7. Political Issue Preference by Years

117

VII. 8. Voters' Registration and Participation
in Elections in the U.S . ............................

119

viii

CONTENT OF APPENDICES

.......................................
MAJOR VARIABLES AND INDICES ....................

I. APPENDIX I

II. APPENDIX II

.......................................

CENSUS DATA AND CURRENT SAMPLE
III. APPENDIX III

........... .................... .... ...

QUESTIONNAIRE (in English)
QUESTIONNAIRE (in Korean)

ix

....................
.....................

146
147
155

156
161

162
169

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem
Voluntary organizations are known as crucial requisites for
democracy in Western societies, where economic and political liberalism prevailed in the post-Reformation era, ahead of the development of
political pluralism.

But there are other cultures in which the egali-

tarian human quality and voluntaristic impulses in human nature have
not been fully recognized.

In such cultures, the self-concept and

human relations are more likely to be fashioned by an authoritarian
outlook.
Authoritarianism is a set of cultural prescriptions for human
relations and that may shape personality through socialization. As a
personality syndrome it exhibits submissiveness to authority, aggressiveness, fatalism, low tolerance, and rigidity in ideas.
The bi-variate relationship between authoritarianism and low
participation in voluntary organizations is well documented; its
effect as an antecedent variable in pluralism models has not been
fully tested.

Extremely high participation in the electoral process

(as exhibited in the Phillipines,

0r

Korea) coupled with high protest

activities are opposite phenomena of "diffuse support" which is an
essential for the stable democracy.

These behavioral phenomena could

have their roots in authoritarian submissiveness and aggression.
1

In

2
other words, with highly authoritarian people, political pluralism
may be difficult to apply.

However, if the theses of pluralism are

universally valid, they should be operable among highly authoritarian
people through mobilization or mediation by voluntary organizations.
Authoritarianism is also found even in some segments of democratic societies such as America.

Such authoritarianism may have its

roots in the childhood socialization or may reflect experiences from
lower class position.

Authoritarian persons are less likely to par-

ticipate in voluntary organizations, but there are voluntary organizations that induce even authoritarians to get involved (such as religious or political extremist movements).

Such nonvoluntary involve-

ment in organizations is more likely to happen in societies where governments can forge such organizations and pressure the people to join
them.

Also, even in free societies, those who feel alienated and root-

less (such as some racial minorities and new immigrants in America) are
more likely to join the readily accessible organizations (N. Babchuck

& R.B. Thompson, 1962).
When people's participation in voluntary organizations is less
voluntaristic and when such people are highly authoritarian, the political socialization effects of the voluntary organizations may become
questionable.

If voluntary organizations do not function to modify

highly authoritarian attitudes, which might be related to low political
efficacy despite high participation in the electoral process, they can
be easily mobilized by totalitarian political movements.

Also, if the

voluntary organizations do not function as countervailing devices
against oppressive regimes, authoritarians might easily use them as

3

their protest channels to release their repressed aggression toward
the regime or authority figures.
countries.

This is happening in less developed

The two faces of authoritarian vulnerability have been well

demonstrated especially in Iran under the Shah and later under Khomeni.
It is also questionable how the new immigrants from such authoritarian
backgrounds would do in a new voluntaristic social setting.
In order to explore this question further, the writer selected
a specific ethnic group which is relatively new to this country and
supposedly highly authoritarian.

The case in point is the Korean

imnigrant group in the Chicago area.

The Koreans have been the third-

fastest growing immigrant group in the United States during the 1970s.
The yearly inflow of this group reached more than 30,000, exceeding
the annual immigration quotas assigned them during the late 1970s.
Currently, the Korean-American population is estimated at more than
1

1,000,000 of which 80,000 are said to be living in the Chicago area.
The social network of Chicago Koreans includes 100-plus ethnic
churches (including house churches), more than 200 voluntary organizations, and two Korean-language daily newspapers.

But this group

is experiencing difficulties in organizing political leadership and
mobilizing its resources for political goals.

That is why the general

applicability of the pluralism model is brought into question.
B. The Korean Political Culture
The dominant features of Korean political culture are precisely
described by Khil (1984) as: the politics of hierarchy and deference,
the politics of voter mobilization, increasing participatory orienta-

Ui
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tion, widening elite-mass cleavage, and the politics of defiance during
acute crises.

Those characteristics can be summarized in three elements

which are relevant to this study.
1. The Politics of Hierarchy and Deference
The most dominant characteristics of Korean politics appear as
hierarchy and deference in authority relations.

Those who are in lead-

ership position perceive their roles to be active, commanding ones,
while those on the receiving end accept their roles as blind submissive ones.

Vertical and unequal interpersonal relations prevail in

Korean society at every level including family, school, formal group,
and workplace, all probably manifesting the Confucian hierarchical
principle.

Such verticality is especially acute between the rulers and

the governed, elite and mass.

The ruler takes a paternalistic attitude

toward the mass, and the ruled accept total submission toward and compliance with the authority.
On the basis of this hierarchical structuring, it is relatively

easy for the person in power to exercise supreme leadership with the
support of loyal military generals and technocrats.

Political parti-

cipation by the masses is tightly controlled and manipulated by the
supreme leader.
The sense of deference for persons in superior position is found
in the public language.
most collectivities.

Nopun-Saram (someone on high) exists in

Especially the word Gowicheung (high ranks)

formerly a common word, is now being used as a formal expression by the
newspapers to indicate the President indirectly.

Decisions made by the

President are referred to Youngdan (heroic decisions) by the major

5

Korean news media.
2. Politics of Voter Mobilization
The Korean constitution has prescribed universal voting rights
since the 1948 independence of the Republic of Korea in the south.
During the four decades since, five regimes have succeeded, in turn,
with most of the rulers manipulating the popular vote.

The earlier

three civilian regimes allowed free elections manipulating the process
with maximum participation by the less educated voters in supporting
the candidates or issues presented by the ruling party.

The opposi-

tion party could obtain a foothold only in the big cities.

This split

in support is termed Yo-chon Ya-do (ruling party in farms, opposition in cities).

The two recent military regimes have tightly con-

trolled and manipulated elections, blocking the direct election of the
President who sits at the apex of the power pyramid and whose defeat
would mean the collapse of the ruling party.
Therefore, political participation in Korea is largely the result
of directives from Gowicheung (President) with the citizenry compelled to play essentially passive roles in campaigns and voting.

Other-

wise, their livelihoods could be directly or indirectly threatened.
Political participation is not of the voluntary kind generally found
in Western democracies.

Mass participation operates by habitual com-

pliance with the order of authority, not by voluntary support.

The

increasing political participation in post-war Korea has not been a
direct result of conscious choice by the populace, except for the
case of the short-lived, chaotic, liberal regime of premier Chang
Myun in 1960-61.
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3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion
There has been a wide gap between the Korean elites and masses
in their perception of political issues through the past century.

This

gap is an outgrowth of the caste system of traditional Korea, and still
fosters class consciousness among the masses.

The most recent caste

system in Korea was the Yang-bahn system (twin-class of scholars and
warriors), while all others remained as Sang-min (common people). Only
Yang-bahn had the right to be recruited to public offices, with Sangmin rarely having such opportunity until the turn of the 20th century.
The masses (Sang-min) were not even allowed to have an education
(mostly reading Confucian literatures in tutorial settings) until the
final days of the Yi dynasty (1890s).

The masses were not expected to

hold opinions on social issues, let alone political ones, in traditional
Korea.

But the elite-mass gap in perception and preference on conflict-

ing issues historically resulted in several revolts by the masses.
The Tonghak revolt (1894) was the most significant uprising in
the political modernization of Korea because it was based on beliefs in
egalitarianism.

The leader of this revolt proclaimed that man had dev-

ine quality and all were created equally.

But this religio-political

movement was crushed by foreign troops and resulted in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95.
Although Tonghak might not have been clearly referred to, its
spirit or sense of people's rights has played a key role in more contemporary bloody revolts in Korea.

Outbreaks of defiance and rebel-

lion have often had the explosive power of a volcanic eruption when
the masses have perceived governmental authorities and policies to be

7
arbitrary and unjust.

The Sam-il (March 1, 1919) independence move-

ment against the Japanese colonial rulers, the April Student Revolution
of 1960 against Syngman Rhee's dictatorial regime, and the 1980 Kwangju uprising against the current military power group all are said to
have been triggered by the spirit of Minjoong (people or masses).
Because the Korean people are generally submissive to and deferential toward authority during normal and routine periods, their acts
of defiance and rebellion may sound contradictory and incomprehensible.
But it is significant that their anger and frustration have accumulated
under the cover of passive and compliant behavior, over a period of
time.

Nevertheless, an act of defiance, when it reaches the boiling

point of massive protest, takes the form of violence, including anarchic
behavior.
The questions explored through this research are expected to shed
some light, not only on the potential of this group's political assimilation into the United States, but also on the potential for democracy in
their homeland.

The findings may have similar relevance for other new

innnigrant groups coming from similar authoritarian backgrounds and for
those in their homelands.
C. Theoretical Aims of the Research
This study links the variables at three levels of analysis: personality, culture, and society.

A research of this nature has a poten-

tial for contributing to at least the following purposes.
1. Voluntary Organization Research
This study explores the psychological roots opposite to volun-

8

tarism and attempts to link them to the positive functions of voluntary
organizations.

By doing this, this study could partially fill a notable

gap in research between the powerful effects of parental socialization
vs. those of voluntary organizations (D.H. Smith, 1975). It aims also
to shed some light on the question of whether attitude and personality
dispositions are to be seen as causes or consequences of voluntary
organization participation.

The answers vary by researchers and the

issue remains unresolved.
2. The Theory of Socialization
The effects of earlier (parental) socialization have been widely
studied.

But adult socialization, especially the causes of sudden

attitudinal and behavioral changes in the later life-cycle, needs more
attention.

This study offers a comparison of the effects of child and

adult socializations.
3. The Theory of Unconventional Political Participation
Unconventional political participation (protest activities) is a
new area of study in political sociology and political science (Barnes

& Kasse, 1979). The deterrent effect of voluntary organizations to
protest activities has been suggested by mass politics theorists (Kornhauser, 1959), but voluntary organizations can also promote protest
activities.

This study will explore the strengths in both directions.

D. Plan of Presentation
After reviewing related literature in Chapter II, theoretical
designs and major variables are discussed in Chapter III. Historical
backgrounds and demographic description of Korean immigrants (as a part

9
of the findings) are presented in Chapter IV.

Authoritarian features

and involvement in organizations are described in Chapter V; then, in
the same chapter, political affects are examined as the dependent variable of authoritarianism under the influence of organizational involvement.

Chapter VI deals with how the respondents' voting participation

and political issue preferences are affected by the preceding variables
(authoritarianism, organizational involvement, and political affects).
In Chapter VII, major findings are summarized and discussed within the
theoretical framework of political sociology and also within that of
adaptation theories.

Then the conclusion of the research follows in

Chapter VIII.

NOTE
1. Data from the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C.; published
by the Korea Times-Chicago, March 12, 1987.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. Pluralism
1, Background of Pluralism
The role of voluntary associations in democracy has drawn the
attention of political theorists since Aristotle.

As a socio-politi-

cal theory, pluralism has its origins in Greek and Judaeo-Christian
heritages.

The decisive event for the uniquely pluralistic character

of the West is the Reformation and its outcomes.

Religious toleration

and freedom of conscience were conceived as a natural right.
Locke assumed that individuals have the unalienable right to
associate and that this right of groups demythologized the soverignty
of the state (Horn, 1969).

English pluralists of the 19th and 20th

centuries promoted the demythicizing of the state and anticipated active participatory citizenship (Laski, 1920; Cole, 1920).
Although voluntary associations are found in many other societies, their successful integration into the political system is viewed
as primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon.

Tocqueville (1947) was the

first author who perceived the connection between the proliferation of
voluntary associations in America and the democratic character of the
society.

Pluralism has been the unspoken ideology of American politi-

cal practice as both a normative and an empirical frame of reference
for much of the nation's history.
10
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In France, voluntary associations were selectively restricted
by Rousseau's theory of "general will" which was hostile to plural
societies.

Therefore, a number of repressed associations developed

but were not allowed to function openly in the political arena (Rose,
1954).
In Germany, both the conception and tradition of voluntary associations were confined within a corporate view.

German liberal theo-

rists of the 19th century considered the rights of individuals as subordinate to those of community and the state.

The crucial ideas of

natural law and of the state as an association with limited purposes
were absent from German political theory.

This is why Germans moved in

the direction of political nihilism and totalitarianism (Iggers, 1965).
The Western philosophical and religious beliefs, ethical aspirations, empirical findings, and structure of personalities are more or
less sufficiently integrated to the foundations for the theory and
practice of political pluralism, although there is still a lack of
understanding of its processes of integration (Chapman, 1969, p.93).
In the American scene, the role of voluntary associations in
the democratic process has been examined and explained by Lipset and
his colleagues (1956).

They asserted that democratic politics neces-

sarily rest on a multitude of independent organizations.
Such organizations serve in a society as a whole or in unions
(i) as arenas within which new ideas are generated, (ii) communication networks through which people may learn and form attitudes
about politics, (iii) as means of training potential opposition
leaders in skills of politics, and as a place in which they can
attain the status necessary to become political leaders, (iv) as
one of the principal means of getting individuals to participate
in the larger political arena, and (v) as bases of opposition to
the central authority (1956, p.89).
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2. Two Analytical Models of Pluralism
The choice of an explanatory model of pluralism is basic to
definitions of democracy.

In the conflict perspective, political

democracy is the process in which all active and legitimate groups
compete to receive a hearing at some crucial stage in the process of
making a decision.

The task of the political process is to accommo-

date the conflicting demands of individuals or groups, with the dominant mechanism as bargaining (Dahl, 1965; Keim, 1975).
In the structural-functional perspective, democracy is a system
which recognizes and enforces the rights of the individual to participate in making decisions that affect him and his community (Bacharch,
1975).

The key processes are direct or indirect participation in the

formulation and dispersion of opinion and in decision making.

The

dominant mechanism in this process is arriving at consensus by maximum
participation in voting.
These two processes are complementary, and the study of conditions encouraging democracy, therefore, must focus on the sources of
both cleavage and consensus (Lipset, 1963).

Upon the choice of pers-

pective, whether to maximize consensus through optimal participation
by individuals or whether to accommodate conflicting demands of groups
in their access to power, pluralists make distinctions between mobilization and intermediation models.
a. Mobilization Model
The mobilization version (which underlies the social participation thesis) focuses on individual actors and maintains that involvement in voluntary associations will activate individuals politically.

13

The theorists of this version emphasize the recruiting and training
function of voluntary associations for potential political actor. They
posit, after K. Deutsch's (1961) concept, that mobilization is "the
process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available
for new patterns of socialization and behavior."

Deutsch uses this

concept in the context of modernization of traditional societies and
argues that this progress is required for political development.
Although the original concept denotes institutional, normative,
and attitudinal changes at a macro-societal level, it also involves
the induction processes of personal activities by mobilizing agents.
People caught in traditional societies and politically inactive must
be mobilized through involvement in new social contexts (such as voluntary associations) if they are to become politically active.
The mobilization perspective rests on several assumptions:
involvement in voluntary associations (i) broadens an individual's
interest in political affairs and issues; (ii) stimulates the individual's political activity via interactions with others; (iii) increases one's information and leadership skills; and (iv) provides gratification for participation in political activities and a sense of satisfaction with the democratic process as members perceive the process
and results in concrete situation (D.L. Rogers et al., 1975).
The politically relevant key process in the voluntary organization is socialization of the members or the participants. This
socializing process is easily, and perhaps best, explained with the
concept of "reference group."

Finifer (1974) made her argument on the

14

basis of three related propositions, that: (i) people do identify with
members in the groups; (ii) these identifications motivate responsiveness to normative cues coming from the groups; and (iii) the level of
integration varies according to the degree of identifications with
1

others in the groups.
The effects of participation in voluntary association have been
demonstrated by many empirical data as active political involvement.
Although they did not explicitly mention the mobilization theory,
numerous researchers since W. Dennis (1930) found a causal relation2
ship between involvement in voluntary associations and in politics.
It is also postulated that political participatory behavior is preceded

by a set of attitudinal and value changes.

The aggregate of

the attitudes and values held by the people of a given society is
called their political culture.
The concept of political culture was first introduced by Gabriel
Almond (1956).

Political culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs, and

sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and
govern the political behavior in a given political system. Almond
(1951), citing Parsons and Shils' General Theory of Action, identified three elements of political culture as (i) the cognitive, (ii)
the affective, and (iii) the evaluative. Almond (1956), along with
Verba (1965) introduced several measurable dimensions of political
culture.

Within their approach, political efficacy is considered

as the key predisposing variable in personal political activity.
Efficacy is an outcome of various socializations through the political
actors' lives, and political mobilization at a macro-level can have
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much effect on it.

It is both the product of a political system and

the life history of the members of that system.

Thus, they treated

political culture as both an independent and dependent variable of the
political system (Almond and Verba, 1980).
Almond and Verba (1965) saw "political affect," as the aggregate
form of the psychological dimension of politics, and as the key element
of political efficacy.

"The feeling is perhaps the most important test

of the legitimacy of its political system and it is also the most important measure of political alienation and aspiration" (1965, 100 252).

These emotional elements are oriented toward (i) the political

system as a whole (system affect), (ii) the administration and regulations (output affect), (iii) the processes and agencies involved in
election and policy implementation (input affect), and (iv) the political actor himself being subject to the political system (civic
3
affect).
System theorists were more concerned about the objective affect
felt toward the system.

lane's key concept, "trust in the system"

(1962) and Easton's concept of "diffuse support" (1965), correspond to
Almond and Verba's "system output affect" or "objective competence"
(1965).

"Political culture" is a public subculture which is the res-

ource of political socialization, and which can be acquired by individuals through internalization.

Also it has been proved that invol-

vement in voluntary organizations results in a significant increase of
efficacy.

Almond and Verba found in their five-nation study that mem-

bership even in nonpolitical organizations affects the members' political attitudes.

They postulated that the experience of social inter-
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action, the opportunity to participate in decision making, and the
general broadening of perspectives that occurs in the organizational
activities all would be expected to increase individuals' potential
for political involvement.

And they found in all five nations they

surveyed that those respondents who are members of organizations are
generally higher in the subjective competence scale and those respondents who consider their organizations to be involved in politics have
higher subjective competence (1963, 305-373). J.D. Wright (1970) and
R.E. Bunch (1974) also found similar results in their research.
For the last three decades, the theoretical and methodological
flaws with the major variables of political culture have not been resolved.

However, their concepts and measures have been narrowed to

three separate variables; ie. "internal (political) efficacy," "external (political) efficacy," and "poltical trust" (Craig, 1979).
b. Mediation Model
The mediation model focuses on the autonomy of voluntary associations and their protective function for individuals against monopolized power.

The so-called "mass society" viewpoint holds that the des-

truction of old communities has separated individuals from social ties,
and that this atomization has produced a sense of powerlessness which
can be both personally devastating and destructive to democratic processes.

Their important theme concerns the organizational tie that

must mediate between the isolated, hence potentially powerless, individuals and the massive state.
There are two major versions of mass political theory originating from two opposite intellectual sources (Kornhauser, 1959, p.21f).
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The democratic version asserts that the masses are vulnerable to domination by the elite.

This danger to political order and civil liberty

is believed to result from the automization of society and the rise of
an elite capable of mobilizing isolated and unattached people.

The

aristocratic version stresses that the primary cause of mass politics
lies in the loss of exclusiveness of the elite as a result of greater
popular participation in the critical center of society.

According to

this version, the main danger to political order and civil liberty is
the domination of the elite by masses.
Arnold Rose postulated that in the United States a plurality of
voluntary organizations plays a major role in supporting democracy by
(i) distributing power over social life among a large portion of the
people (1954. p.51); (ii) by serving "to tie society together and to
minimize the disintegrating effects of conflict;" and (iii) by giving
individuals a feeling of identification and status (1967, pp.250-51).
In contrast, French voluntary organizations were ineffective in mediation because they were based on the tradition of Catholicism, a liberal tradition concerned with freedom of individuals, and a strong repressive central government (1954, p.114).
Kornhauser (1959) saw that there are tendencies toward loss of
autonomy both by the elite and by independent groups in modern society.

A society is a "mass society" to the extent that both elite and

nonelite are directly accessible to one another by virtue of the weakness of groups capable of mediating between them.

Mass politics occurs

when a large number of people engage in political activity outside the
procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action.
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Kornhauser argues that liberal democracy requires widespread
participation in the selection of leaders and a large amount of selfgoverning activity on the part of the nonelite. And to the basic question of what kind of social structure meets these conditions of liberal
democracy, Kornhauser answers that social pluralism is the arrangement
which performs this function.
A plurality of independent and limited-function groups supports liberal democracy by providing social bases of free and open
competition for leadership, widespread participation in the selection of leaders, restraint in the application of pressures on leaders, and self-government in wide areas of social life. Therefore,
where social pluralism is strong, liberty and democracy tend to be
strong; and conversely, forces which weaken social pluralism also
weaken liberty and democracy (1959. pp.230-31).
Neal and Seeman (1964) have argued that what is congruent with
the mass society thesis is that "membership in mediating organizations
is an element in generating a fundamental sense that the persons' social world is manageable."

Their finding supported the idea that power-

lessness is a function of the lack of mediating organizational ties.
However, they were unsure whether organizational membership leads to
low alienation (structural argument) or that only the nonalienated
join organizations (motivational argument).

They agreed that both

processes were in operation in their research.
Therefore, the theory of mass society stresses the need for the
autonomy of certain social units if order with freedom is to be secured, whether primary emphasis is placed on the autonomy of the elite
or on the nonelite (Neal and Seeman 1964, pp.226-29).
The mediation version of pluralism takes the view that even
normally nonpolitical associations can temporarily play the role of
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"para-political" actors by participating directly in the political
system, influencing political leaders' decision making and providing
the channels between the political elite and their constituents.

In

this approach, voluntary associations are seen as the actors, even
while the effects on members are not focused.
What we should consider along with mediation model is the impact
of unconventional political involvement by the masses.

Unconventional,

noninstitutional political behavior has received comprehensive attention from Gurr (1968).

Disruptive political protest is seen to have

its roots in relative deprivation of general values (Gurr, 1968).

A

lack of general affect toward political authority was deemed as an
alternative motive for protest behaviors by Gamson (1968) and Wright
4

(1970).

Easton termed this as lack of "diffuse support" (1965).

Muller (1972) differentiated political dissent from conventional political behavior on the basis of the presence or absence of three properties: (a) conformity to legal regime norms, (b) conformity to customary regime norms, and (c) the use of violence.
The mobilization and mediation versions of pluralistic theory
are not incompatible, and both functions could be performed by the
same association.

However, those are separate processes that must

be kept analytically distinct.
B. Authoritarianism
Considerations of the role of authoritarian character in social
structure and the rise of Fascism began in the 1930s and 1940s.

The

debate was continued after Adorno and his colleagues (1950) introduced
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the F-scale to measure anti-semitic prejudice.

Because of the rigid-

ity of their ego defense-mechanisms, susceptibility to radical political ideologies, and tendencies toward submission/domination, authoritarian personalities have been also considered as non- or antidemocratic personalities.

The negative relationship between authoritarianism

and democratic political process has been widely recognized.
Although Adorno admitted that it was not possible to use their
F-scale alone as the basis of selecting their interviewees, they were
confident of relating the 38-item F-scale to various other indices of
antidemocratic personality, brought to light by other techniques.
They did not proceed with this in a strictly empirical fashion but
were guided by a theoretical orientation, constructing each scale item
with a hypothesis, involving following variables (1950. p.228f):
(i) Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to conventional middleclass values. (ii) Authoritarian submission: Submissive attitude
toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group. (iii) Authoritarian aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to
condemn those who violate the conventional values. (iv) Antiintraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the
tender-minded. (v) Superstition and stereotype: Belief in mystic
determinants of the individual's fate. (vi) Power and toughness:
Preoccupation with dominance-submission, strong/weak, leader/follower dimension(identifies with power figures). (vii) Destructiveness and cynicism: Generalized hostility and vilification of the
human. (viii) Projectivity: Projection outwards of wild emotional
impulses. (ix) Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on'
These variables were thought of as going together to form a psychological cluster, more or less enduring personality structure that
predisposes him to be receptive to anti-democratic propaganda.

The

coherence of the scale items could better be explained theoretically,
by positing an inner structure of personality than on the ground of
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external association.

Also in order to cover a widely underlying the-

ory, single items were sometimes used to represent two or more different concepts

(228~229).

5

Despite the criticisms and attempts to replace the F-scale,
there followed empirical evidence which showed that authoritarianism
and other personality traits patterned by early childhood socialization can be transferred to one's political attitudes (Pye, 1962;
Almond and Verba, 1963; Renshon, 1977).

Authoritarians tend to have

low political efficacy and low trust in the system (Greenstein, 1965;
Rosenau, 1975).

And authoritarianism is related to an isolationist

6
attitude, lack of efficacy, and nonvoting (Knutson, 1972).

It is also

related to a habit of submission, little access to the sources of information, lack of verbal facility, and unwillingness to participate
in middle-class culture (Knuffer, 1947).

Authoritarians do not join

many community groups as compared with nonauthoritarians (Sanford,
Janowitz & Marvick (1953) and Sanford (1950) noted that the

1950).

F-scale was related negatively to voting in a cross-cultural sample.
Milbrath and Klein (1962) found the tendency for high F-scorers to
shun political activities.
However, authoritarianism is not always related to nonparticipation.

Mass politics theorists found that authoritarians are more

susceptible to totalitarian mobilization (Kornhauser, 1959).

Lane

found that; authoritarians tend to have lower political efficacy and
lower political participation; to be more susceptible to group pressure or to personal and material advantages which make them join organizations and participate in politics (Lane, 1972).

Massive partici-
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pation by such authoritarians might endanger the stability of the
system because of their submissiveness to authority and their need to
express their unconscious hostility (Greenstein, 1969).

NOTES
1. Freeman & Showe! (1950) are those who focused on mobilization effect through organizations as reference groups, and so did
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Verba & Nie (1972), Olsen (1972),
D.Jaros & L.Grant (1974).
2. This relationship has been supported in the studies by
Freedman & Alex (1952), Berelson et.al. (1954), Hastings (1954),
Lipset et.al. (1956), C.R.Wright & H.H.Hyman (1958), Lane (1959),
Milbrath (1965), and others.
3. Apart from the above authors, Campbell (1954) developed the
Sense of Political Efficacy Scale, which measures an individual's
feelings about the effects of his own action on political events.
This is equivalent to Almond and Verba's 'subjective competence'
(Wright, 1972). As Gamson (1968) narrowed down 'political culture'
into two measurable dimensions, 'efficacy' (input dimension) and
'trust' (output dimension), 'political culture' has been generally
measured by the foregoing two types of scales.
4. Another explanation comes from social learning theory. Some
suitable cues (such as ideology or successful experience of aggressive model behaviors) will lead to aggressive behavior. In addition
to this cognitive/motivational explanation, Kass & March (1979) gave
attention to the individual's position in the society (status, age,
organizational membership, etc.) and socio-political values as the
important antecedent variables of political action.
5. R. Christie (1954) asserted that the F-scale captured something other than authoritarianism because it was constructed without a
hypothesis and adequate data. Christie and P. Cook (1958) again criticized that it tapped only earlier childhood authoritarianism.
Greenstein (1965, 1969) saw the F-Scale as a valuable tool in connecting psychology and political studies but expressed his doubts about
the exact content it was supposed to be measuring. He also pointed
out the response-set problem with the scale. C. Bay criticized its
cognitive simplification (1958). E.Shils (1954) criticized the Fscale for failing to discriminate between leftist and rightist autho-

23
ritarianism.
Knutson (1972) critically reviewed the F-scale as setting a
false dichotomy without narrowing down rightist authoritarianism and
without mentioning democratic scale. She saw the F-scale measuring
the individual's value prefereces rather than personality traits.
However, there have been many researchers who have tried to improve
the utility of the F-scale.
R. Lee and P. Warr (1969), Byrne(l974) are among those who tried
it in two respects: (i) by attempting to extract the scale items for
behavioral traits from those for value (belief) preferences, and (ii)
by attempting to offset the response set problems. Berkowitz and
Walkon (1964), Gough and Lazzari (9174) successfully tested F scale by
reducing the original items.
Ray (1976) focused on the dominance-submission dimension of the
authoritarian personality and developed a 26-item Directiveness scale.
Both scales appeared to have a positive relationship with the F-scale
and to be usable along with the F-scale.
Instead of F-scale, Rokeach (1960) developed his Dogmatism
scale which measures the rigidity of personality in value preferences.
He argued that the Dogmatism scale was associated with the F-scale but
was more accurate in dealing with authoritarianism (1967).
6. There is some empirical evidence which did not confirm the
relationship between authoritarianism and low political activity.
Knutson (1972) rather hypothesized that authoritarians with lower
needs to fulfill will be nonparticipants, while those motivated by
unfulfilled needs for affection or esteem will join or lead organizations. She attempted to test Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' (1943)
in association with authoritarianism in political behavior.

CHAPTER

III

THEORETICAL DESIGN AND DATA

A. Postulates and Hypotheses
The following postulates and hypotheses are derived from the
previous theoretical considerations within the review of the literature, and have been tested against data.
1. Postulates
a. Those high in authoritarian personality traits are less
active in their participation in voluntary organizations and in politics than those with low authoritarian traits.
b. Individuals have different cognitions, affects, and evaluations of their roles in the political system and the performance of
the political system.

The aggregate of such cognitions, affects, and

evaluations is a part of the political culture of a given society.
And

the political culture of each country is a key factor which fost-

ers or inhibits political participation, development of democracy, and
stability of the polity.
c. Participation in voluntary organizations does politicize
individuals by increasing their knowledge about politics, sensitivity
to issues, and skills or capacity to act politically and most of all
it increases political competence.
d. Participation in the electoral process (from campaign to
voting) is the major type of political activity which fulfills the
24
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principle of democracy.

However, protest behaviors also have their

part in the democratic process if discretely exercised.
2. Hypotheses
a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary
organizations have higher political competence than authoritarians
who do not participate in voluntary organizations, in terms of their
affect about their own position as a political subject, their ability
to influence the political system, the output responses by the political system, and the national political system as a whole.
b. Among authoritarians, those who participate in voluntary
organizations and have higher political competence are more likely to
participate in the electoral process than those who do not participate
in voluntary organizations.
c. In their choices of political issues, the authoritarian
and politically less competent individuals exhibit significantly different emphases than their less authoritarian and more politically
competent counterparts.

The authoritarian/ less competent are more

likely to pref er basic needs-oriented and homeland-oriented political
issues.
B. Variables
1. Independent Variable
a. Authoritarianism: There are a number of versions of the Fscale designed and tested by researchers.

In the 1972 National Elec-

tion Study (by SRC), a six-item scale was used to measure authoritarian
aggression and submission, deleting other dimensions of the F-scale.
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This SRC scale was adopted in the current study, with minor changes
in wording to convey culturally relevant meanings and to prevent
response-set problems.
The original design of this study assumed that these six items
would form a single scale that measures one dimension, i.e., authoritarian aggression/submission.

But examination of the correlation among

the six items (and with dependent variables) revealed that these items
are measuring at least two different dimensions (authoritarian submission/aggression and liberal/conservative attitude) simultaneously.
Therefore, two separate indices, Authoritarian Index and Liberalism
Index, were constructed (Appendix I.1.).
2. Intervening Variable
a. Organizational Participation: In the current study, eight
types of ethnic (provincial, alumni, service-oriented, professional,
etc.) organizations were specified.

The degree of participation was

measured by the respondent's total number of memberships, officerships,
and frequency of attendance in organizations; they made the composite
Organizational index (Appendix I.2.).

Involvement in churches is ex-

cluded from the index because its voluntariness has been questionable.
3. Dependent Variable
a. Political Efficacy: Taking the affective dimension from
the political culture approach (Almond and Verba, 1963), the current
study measured (i) the individual's feeling about being subjected to
the political system, (ii) input affect to the political processes,
(iii) output affect toward the political system, and (iv) the feeling
about the political system as a whole.
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Following the theoretical model of Almond and Verba (1963),
R.E. Bunch (1968) studied the political orientation of JapaneseAmericans of Oregon.

Since the scale items revised by Bunch were too

complicated to use in a mailed survey, this researcher used a new
omnibus of political competence scales, deleting cognitive and evaluative dimensions from the !CPR questionnaire (Appendix I.3).
b. Political Participation: It would be desirable to have
this variable as the dependent variable.

But when this study was being

planned, the majority of the sample were not expected to be naturalized
citizens who could vote; and even among the citizens, very few were
expected to have registered for voting.

Therefore, this variable was

not seriously considered as the dependent variable.

However, after

the survey, it was found that Koreans may not be invisible voters.
Some of the political-participation items were designed to measure the future potential of participation by those who were not yet
eligible voters (noncitizens).

These people, also, were asked about

their involvement in the political meetings, monetary contributions,
etc.

Also the potential for political protest activities was examined

as a form of unconventional political participation along with political issue preferences (details in Chapter VI).
C. Data
The primary data were generated from the Korean communities of
the Chicago area and the neighboring Midwestern states by means of a
readership survey of the Korea Times (the largest Korean language
daily newspaper in the Midwest).

The National Election Data -(1972-76
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panel studies by SRC; and 1980-82 Election studies by ICPR) and the
1980 Census data have been partially used for comparison.

The reason

for using the old SRC data is that these are latest available ones
which measured authoritarianism along with participation in voluntary
organizations and in politics.
1. Sampling
There is no way to know the exact size of the population for
the Korean sampling.

The 1980 census enumerated about 24,000 Koreans

in Illinois but the Korean community's own estimate is two or three
times larger than that.

The Korean Directory published by the Korean

Association of Chicago in 1982 lists about 4,000 names.

But compiling

and publishing that kind of list normally takes a year, so a high proportion of the list is out-of-date.

Any chosen list of Koreans in the

area must be checked against the Illinois Bell Directory because these
new immigrants are highly mobile.

Still, this elaboration might ex-

clude those who do not have telephones.

The problem is even worse in

the case of Koreans residing in the neighboring states.
The most reasonable sampling method, in this respect, seems to
be cluster sampling (or area sampling).

While it is impossible to

list the whole Korean-American population in the area, a researcher can
reduce the listing problem to manageable proportions by first sampling
a set of clusters which contain the population and then enumerate/
randomly select from the clusters (Sonia R. Wright, 1979, p.22).
The Korea Times keeps an up-to-date list of its subscribers
(totaling about 7,500 including out-of-state readers), but this list
has limited value for sampling a population because it excludes non-
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subscribers.

However, a readership survey of a considerably large

sampling was expected to bring in a well balanced representation of
the population.

This type of sample could not be random in the sense

that it excludes the nonsubscribers of the newspaper.

But the initial

selection of those who received the questionnaire was done randomly
within the population of the subscribers.

And the cross-comparison

with previous Korean sample studies in the Chicago area and with the
U.S. Census qualified the representativeness of the current sample.
At first, target clusters were identified by postal zip codes
in the city of Chicago and its suburbs while each of the six states
other than Illinois was taken as a single unit.

Thirty per cent of

the subscribers were randomly selected from each target zip code or
units (Appendix II.1.).
Initially 1,077 subscribers (417 from the city of Chicago, 208
from Chicago suburbs, and 452 from neighboring states) were selected.
The first questionnaires were mailed out in mid-September, 1983 (for
the city of Chicago city and its suburbs).

Other than writing in pos-

tal zip codes, the respondents were not asked to identify themselves.
The guarantee for anonymity of the respondents was clearly mentioned
at the top of the questionnaire and in the newspaper's announcement
about the beginning of this survey.
Because the initial return rate was too low, about two-thirds
of the suburban sample and half of the Chicago city sample received a
second wave of questionnaires during the first two weeks of November
1983.

At this time the neighboring state addresses received their

single mailing of questionnaires.

A third wave of questionnaires was
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sent only to Chicago addresses (the size was about 60 per cent of the
second wave) in February 1984.

The final total responses include 268

cases from Chicago and suburbs (return rate 42.6 per cent) and 128
from out of state (return rate 28.3 per cent). The total analyzable
cases reached 344 (36.8 per cent of the total initial samples).
2. Representativeness of the Sample
a. Comparison with the 1980 U.S. Census Data: Because of the
nature of the sampling method, it is necessary to check to what extent
the current sample represents the population.

The mean ages and edu-

cational attainments of the Koreans in the 1980 Census and in the current sample are not significantly different.

Also, occupational char-

acteristics are similar when job-categories are collapsed into whitecollar, blue-collar, and others.

But income categories are much dif-

ferent between the two sets of data (Appendix II.2).
b. Variance within the sampling clusters: Since the data were
gathered from three large clusters with the assumption that each
cluster represented certain local demographic characteristics, it is
necessary to check if the samples from different clusters can be considered as parts of the same population.
The respondents in the three-cluster samples shared the same
characteristics in terms of age and education and almost the same in
occupation.

But income distribution and years of sojourn are differ-

ent across the locality.

Most of the cases in the sample could be

analyzed as a whole, while it may be necessary to control the effects
of occupation, income, and years of sojourn in this country (Appendix
II.3).

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN AMERICANS

A. Historical Background of the Korean Immigrants.
Korea was the last nation in Far East to open her doors to the
United States by signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882.
The history of Korean immigration began in 1903, when 101 Koreans (including 21 women and 25 children) arrived at the Hawaiian sugar-cane
farms as laborers.

By 1905 a total of 7,226 Koreans had immigrated

to Hawaii but then large migrations stopped until the late 1960s.
The first factor in this cessation of Korean immigration is the
U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, which grew out of the Quota Act of 1921
and was known as the Oriental Exclusion law.

These acts limited non-

European immigration, and especially Asians, who were entitled only to
a quota of under 100 per country per year until around the end of World
War II.

All Asians were generally forbidden to become naturalized U.S.

citizens until the passage of Walter-McCarran Act of 1952.
Another factor which blocked Korean immigration was the Japanese
annexation of Korea in 1910.

Under the 36 years of Japanese colonial

rule, almost no Koreans (except about 1,100 "picture brides") were allowed to emigrate to America.

In fact, fewer than 900 students, and

political refugees came to America during that period(l910-1945).
At the end of the World War II, Korea was divided along the 38th
parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union.
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The historical

32
division of this country was discussed in the Potsdam Conference
in July, 1945, and materialized as General Order No.1, drafted on
August 11 by the United States, as the terms of Japanese surrender
in Korea.
The four big powers (The United States, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and China) wanted a military trusteeship in Korea but the
Koreans struggled for an independent government, both in the South
and the North.

Being unable to solve the dispute among themselves and

manipulated by the foreign powers, two separate elections were held,
resulting in two governments in 1948. This election was the first experience of democratic political process for Koreans.
The invasion of the South by the Russian-backed North Koreans in
June, 1950, became a three-year civil war.

The futile war between the

South and North Koreans involving the United Nations forces and Red
Chinese forces ended in July, 1954, leaving the country still divided.
Since then, North Korea has never been friendly to the United States
and the two countries have no formal relationship.

Therefore, Korean

immigrants to the United States are all from South Korea, although some
of them had fled from the North during the Korean War.
Before the Immigration Act of 1965, during the interim period
(from the Korean War to 1964), thousands of Korean brides of American
servicemen and orphans arrived in the United States.

During the period

of 1950-1975, a total of 28,205 Korean war brides arrived in the U.S.,
while 6,293 Korean orphans arrived between 1955-1966 through adoption
(Hurh and Kim, 1984).
Few of the earlier immigrants, however, reached the Midwest and

/
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almost none of them survived here.

The so-called "old timers" are the

few oldest sojourners and the students who came around the end of
World War II, and the hundreds of students who came before the new
immigration act (1951-64).
The war brides of the U.S. servicemen or those who had interracial marriages have been isolated from later Korean immigrant groups.
Only a small portion of those Korean wives of Americans who came after
1965 seem to be trying to become partially integrated with Koreans
among the mass immigration group.
The adopted Korean-born children (during the 1950s) have almost
become lost to the Korean community in the U.S.

About 46 percent of

./

them were hybrid white American-Koreans, 41 percent were pure Koreans,
and the rest were hybrid black American-Koreans (Huhr,1972).
information is available about them.

Not much

But recently the adopting Ameri-

can parents of the pure-Korean orphans are searching for ties with the
Korean communities in large cities to educate their adopted children to
be aware of their heritages and find their own unique ethnic identity.
Therefore, the Korean communities in the Midwest are mainly the
communities of later immigrants (post-1960s) mixed with the small number of the "interim period" student group, who tend to be considered
elite members of the Korean communities.
The majority of constituents of the Midwestern Korean communities-arrived in the United States as the doors were opened by the Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments of 1965.

This law lifted

the quota limits for the nationals of the Eastern Hemisphere and adopted a preference system which assigns a certain portion of anriual im-

I

j

34
migration quotas to family reunion and to those who can fit into the
American labor market segments where manpower is short.
As a result, the Asian share of total immigration to the U.S.

grew from 7.6 percent (1961-65) to 27.4 percent (1969-73), equaling
the European share for the first time in American history.

The Korean

share of the total U.S. immigration increased from 0.7 percent to 3.8
percent during that eight-year period.
Annual Korean immigration numbers exceeded 10,000 by 1971, and
their annual numbers have been maintained above 30,000 since 1976.

In

terms of annual immigration numbers, Korea is the third largest supplier of immigrants after Mexico and the Philippines (Table IV.1).
Even among the new Korean immigrants (since 1965), the demographic configuration has changed drastically over the 20 year period.
Because of the preference system used in issuing immigration visas,
about 75 percent of the Korean immigrants during the 1964-68 period
were professionals, most being physicians, nurses, or scientists and

Table IV.1. Number of Korean Immigrants to the U.S.
Year

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Immigrants

Year

Immigrants

Year

9,314
14,297
18,876
22,930
28,028
28,362
30,803
30,917
29,288
29,248

1980
1981
1982
1983

2,362
2,165
2,492
2,956
3,811
6,045

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Immigrants
32,320
32,633
31,724
33,339

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports
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technicians.
the mid-1970s.

But professional immigration declined noticeably after
Before a minor revision of the immigration law in 1976,

the preference system favored professionals over the family reunion
provisions (60 per cent of available quota for professionals vs. 40
per cent for family reunions).

But this proportional preference was

reversed in 1976, allowing 60 per cent for family reunion and 40 per
cent for professionals (Keely, 1980).
This change of rule reflects the demands of the U.S. labor market.
By 1974-76 the United States was becoming self-sufficient in the prof essional field but needed more people who could fill in the marginal
labor markets.

Therefore, instead of those professional immigrants who

could compete in the middle-upper labor market on their own merits,
their adult brothers and sisters and the families of the latter were
brought in to fill the nonskilled labor markets.

And the later group

invited their aging parents who had grown out of their wage-earning
ages.
Because the permanent residents (legal immigrants) can be naturalized in five years and attain new privileges, such as the right to
file petitions for immigration of their nonimmediate relatives, the
demographic characteristics of the Korean communities are rapidly
changing over a short period of time.
B. Demographic Description of Korean-Americans.
The 1980 Census enumerated 354,593 people in the U.S. (24,351
in Illinois) whose national origin is Korea.

But according to the

Korean government (Passport Office), the number has reached 80Q,OOO,
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and estimates by leaders of the Korean-American communities in large
U.S. cities are about three times higher than the Census numbers.

For

example, in the Los Angeles area, the Korean community claims a quarter
of a million population, Greater New York Koreans claim 120,000, and
Chicago area cognoscenti claim 70,000.

The Washington D.C. and San

Francisco areas each claim 50,000 Koreans.
1. Age, Sex, and Marital Status
As in most other Korean surveys (Huhr and Kim, 1984,b), males
showed a higher response rate (68.7 per cent) than females (31.3 per
cent) to the current survey.

However, according to 1980 Census, the

Korean community of the Chicago SMSA has more females(53.7 per cent)
than males (46.3 per cent).

./

The higher response rate from males in

surveys, as in social activity in general, reflects the Korean culture
still dominated by males.
The majority of Korean-Americans are very young.

Their median

age in nation-wide census is 26.1 years but is 26.9 years in Illinois
(Table IV.2).

Among the five major Asian-American groups in Illinois,

the Koreans are the youngest.

The Japanese have the highest median age

(32.1 years), followed by the Filipinos (30.2 years), the Indians (28.9
years), and Chinese (28.7 years), with the median age of Illinois' total
population being 29.9 years.
The mean age of the current sample is 40.9 years and the median
age is 40 years (minimum 22 years, maximum 82 years).

Considering

that all those who reported their ages are over 20 years old and this
sample was taken three-and-a-half years after the 1980 Census, the age
distributions of the current sample and that of the 1980 Census show
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very similar patterns.

If the age group under 19 years is excluded

from the Census, and the three-and-half year lapse is calculated,
these two age distributions peak (mode) at 39.0 years (Illinois) and
41.7 years (current sample), respectively.

More than four-fifth of

the Koreans in Illinois (84.8 per cent) and of the current sample
1

(83.8 per cent) are in the age category of 20 to 49 (Table IV.3).

Table IV.2. Age Distribution of Koreans

Total Persons
under 9 years
II
10 - 19
II
20 - 29
II
30 - 39
II
40 - 49
II
50 - 59
II
60 - 69
70 and over
sub total
median age

*

National

Illinois

354,593
80,502
59,958
63,212
75,531
44,752
16,022
9,536
5,080

24,351
6,069
3,569
4,100
5,812
2,955
866
728
252

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

29.52 %
35.27
20.90
7.48
4.45
2.37
99.99

26.1

(% 20 years. or older ).

Table IV.3. Age by Sex
Age

Male (%)

20 - 29
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
60 - 69
70 and over
Total
233
Mean Age=40.9

Source: 1980 U.S. Census

~Current

Female (%)

8.2
32.2
39.1
12.9
6.0
1. 7
(68.7)

* 27.87 %
* 39.50
* 20.08
* 5.89
** 4.95
1.71
*100.0
26.9

16.0
50.0
27.4
3.8
1.9
0.9
106 (31.3)

Median Age=40.0

SamEle2

Row Total N
36
128
120
34
6
5
339

Column %
10.6
37.8
35.4
10.0
4.7
1.5
100.0

Missing Cases=5
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Most of the respondents in the current sample (89.2 %) are married and divorce rate is very low (6.4 %), even though this sample is
mostly represented by the age group which could be in a mid-life crisis, indicating strong traditional family solidarity.
2. Educational Achievement
As has been reported (B.L. Kim, 1978c; Hurh et al., 1978; Huhr
and Kim, 1984), the recent Korean immigrants are one of the highly
educated ethnic groups.

About two-thirds (62.8 per cent) of our res-

pendents have graduated from four-year colleges in Korea.

In addition,

more than a quarter (26.9 per cent) received some education in the U.S.,
with 21.3 per cent of the total respondents having received bachelor or
higher degrees in the U.S. (Table IV.4).
This educational achievement appears strikingly identical to
the results of the 1980 U.S. Census, which shows that 61.9 per cent of
Illinois' Koreans are college graduates. The proportion of high school

Table IV.4 .Educational Attainment of the Respondents
Education I (in Korea)
Level of Education

N

under Junior High
9
High School Drop-out
7
High School Graduation 68
College Drop-out
37
College Graduation
174
Some Graduate Work
15
Master's Degree
10
Doctoral Degree
4
No Answer
19
Total
344

%
2.6
2.0
19.8
10.8
50.6
4.4
3.2
1.2
5.5
100.0

Education II(in the U.S.)

N

%

1

0.3
0.3
0.6
4.4
4.7
6.4
7.0
3.2
2.3

1

2
15
16
22
24
11
8

Respondents in the Education II are also included in the
Education I.

f
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graduates (and higher) among Korean-Americans is 83.4 per cent in the
1980 Census (Illinois) and 89.1 per cent in the current sample.

Pro-

bably the respondents in the current sample are slightly more educated,
because a newspaper readership survey attracts more responses from
those who can read and enjoy reading.

Table IV.S. .Educational Attainment of Koreans in Illinois
Years of School Completed
Male

Female

Total

%

Elementary 0 to 4 yrs
5 to 7 yrs
8 yrs

84
79
79

307
481
308

391
560
387

2.97
4.26
2.94

High School 1 to 3 yrs
4 yrs

242
862

597
1,968

839
2,830

6.38
21.53

863
3,434

1,821
2,021

91.4

77.4

College

1 to 3 yrs
4 yrs

Total
% of High School Graduates

2,684 20.42
5,455 41.49
13, 146 99.99
83.44

Source: 1980 U.S. Census.

3. Occupational Status
Previous Korean surveys have revealed (Hurh and Kim, 1980) that
about three-fourth of Koreans in the Los Angeles area were employed;
similarly, 72.3 per cent of the respondents in the current sample are
employed.

More male respondents (82.3 per cent) are employed than

females (49.5 per cent).

The respondents to the current survey show a

slightly higher employment rate than in the 1980 U.S. Census. In the
Census, 69.4 per cent of Illinois' Korean males (over age 16) were in
the labor force vs. 61.4 per cent for females.

This employment rate
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is a little higher than that of Illinois' total population (Tables
2

IV.6 and IV.7).
The first wave of Asian mass immigration with the post-1965
Immigration Amendment was highly professional.

Similarly in the

current sample, one-third (32.5 per cent) are in the professional and
technical groupings, vs. 23 per cent of Illinois' Koreans in the 1980
Census.

The next most represented occupation in the current survey is

proprietors (24.1 per cent), while the skilled or nonskilled factory
workers had the second highest representation (25.8 per cent) in the
1980 Census.

The comparison supports the idea that the current sample

Table IV.6. OccuEational Status of the Survex ResEondents
ComEared with 1980 Illinois Census
Occupations
1.Professionals(M.D., Professor,
Scientist, Clergy etc.)
2.Technicals (Nurses,
Technicians etc.)
3.Managerial (Corp.Managers,
Public Officers, Salesmen)
4.Clericals (Office Clerks,
Assistants, Secretaries etc.)
5.Skilled Labor (Factory Foremen,
Mechanics etc.)
6.Nonskilled Labor (Factory
Assemblers)

Current Survey
%
N

Illinois Census
%
N

25

7.3

1,607

10.1

56

16.3

2,257

14.2

12

3.5

551

3.5

9

2.6

974

6.1

12

3.5

876

5.5

14

4.1

2, 723

17.2

7.Proprietors (Small Business)

60

17.4

985

6.2

8.Service Workers (Janitorial,
House Maid, etc.)
9.0thers

5

1.5

571

3.6

56

16.3

95

27.5

5,321

33.5

344

100.0

15,865

99.9

Unemployed
Total
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fairly represents the occupational status of the Koreans in Illinois
census figures, except that there has been more representation from
the self-employed proprietors.

It might also indicate that during the

three-and-half years since the 1980 Census more factory workers turned
into small-business owners and more people completed training and then
moved into white-collar professions.

Table IV.7. Respondents' Occupation by Sex
Occupations

Male: N

Professional
Technical
Managerial
Clerical
Skilled Worker
Nonskilled Worker
Proprietor
Service Worker
Others Employed
Unemployed

25
41
47
10
4
12
12
2
42
42

%

10.5
17.3
19.8
4.2
1. 7
5.1
5.1
0.8
17.7
17.7

Female: N
0
15
13
2
5
0
2
3
14
53

%

Row Total

0
14.0
12.l
1.9
4.7
0
1.9
2.8
13.1
49.5

25
56
60
12
9
12
14
5
56
95

%

7.3
16.3
17.4
3.5
2.6
3.5
4.1
1.5
16.3
27.6

There are some indications that for Koreans the length of residence in the United States is positively related to higher occupational status (Gamma=.20).

Most of the selected professionals (87.5 per

cent) have lived longer than six years in this country, while 81.6 per
cent of the nonskilled workers have lived in this country for less
than five years.

And among the self-employed small business group,

71.7 per cent have lived in his country for longer than five years.
4. Income Ranks
The average combined annual family gross income of the current
(1983) sample is $35,788 (minimum $4,000, maximum $300,000). -This is

'
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much higher than the median income for all Illinois' families ($22,746
in 1980) and for white families ($23,999).

But the median family in-

come of Koreans in the 1980 Census ($20,485) is lower than the above
figures.

Although inflation during the three-year time lapse is con-

sidered, the current sample seems to have drawn more respondents from
higher income groups.

If it is true that people state income moder-

ately in public reports but inflate it when talking to fellow Koreans,
the census income statistics may be incorrect.

This tendency has been

mentioned by accountants or real-estate salesmen in the community.
Age has no relationship to high income among the current Korean
respondents, but the type of occupation and length of sojourn in
3
this country are positively related. Professionals and technicians
may well earn high salaries, but it is the small-business operators
who are doing best among all occupational groups in the Korean community.

The current data clearly support speculations in the community

that small-business operators are the best-off among Koreans.
The existence of status inconsistency in a mid-age group who are
highly educated and financially well-off but unsatisfied with their

Table IV.8. Income Status of the Respondents
Income Level ($)
15,000
under
16,000 - 25,000
26,000 - 35,000
36,000 - 50,000
over
50,000
Total

N

%

37
82
72
57
96
344

10.5
23.9
21.0
16.7
28.0
100.0

!

/
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social positions may have many implications for political potential.
According to Kim and Hurh's study of Chicago's Southside (1984, b),
(mostly Black and I.atino areas) businesses, 60.7 per cent of Korean
small-business people are college graduates.

While the proprietors \/"

are well educated like other Koreans in general, and so have high
achievement motivation, they cannot find satisfying positions in the
occupational strata in America, perhaps because of language barriers
and lack of know-how, or because of discrimination •
Although they have achieved some success in monetary terms in
their businesses, they are trying to find more meaning in their lives,
because with their high educational attainments they do not want merely to end up as 'mom-and-pop' shop merchants in black or Latino areas.
'Ibis sense of status discrepancy (Y. Lee, 1978) may have a potential
for political action.

NOTES
1. A similar age distribution was also found in Studies of
Korean Small Business of Southside Chicago (Kim and Huhr,1984,b).
The average age of the 94 respondents of their study is 39.8 years
(ranging from 21 to 50).
2. In the 1980 census, only 63.9 per cent of males of all races
were in the labor force vs. 51.6 per cent of all females. Although
the Census statistics included teen-age (over age 16) unemployment,
and the current survey does not, both Korean males and females have a
higher employment rate than do average Illinois residents.
3. For example, the proportion of those who earned more than
$50,000 a year is· 79.1 % for selected professionals, 64.3 % for technical, 58.4 % for managerial, 33.3 % for clerical, 50 % for skilled
workers, 35.7 % for nonskilled, 81.6 % for proprietors, 20 % for the
service workers, and 64.3 % cent of others.

CHAPTER V

AUTHORITARIANISM, ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION
AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

A. Authoritarianism
In this chapter, we shall explore the extent of authoritarian
characters, organizational involvement, and their relationship with
political efficacy among the respondents.
With the six items selected to measure mainly authoritarian
aggression and submissiveness, the Koreans in the current sample
expressed more authoritarian aggression-submission on three out of
the four items than did Americans (compared with the American sample
in the National Election Studies by SRC, 1972-76).

And Koreans showed

less egalitarianism in the two items than did Americans (Table V.1).
The strong support for women's political participation, in
contrast to the strong agreement with most of the authoritarian items,
was somewhat unexpected.

It may partially indicate that egalitarian

values in gender roles are being inculcated among Korean-Americans.
Korea has been a male-dominant society, where the female's main role
is being a faithful housewife.

But in the immigrant families wives'

participation in the labor market and the inevitable sharing of household chores with their husbands seem to be bringing some changes in
the balance of authority into the family (Kim and Huhr, 1984 a.).
However, the cross-tabulations among authoritarianism items reveals
44
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Table V.1 Comparison of Responses to Six Authoritarian Items
Among Koreans and Americans

Items

Koreans
(Current Sample)

Americans
(1972 Election Studies)

1. What young people need most is strict parental discipline.

Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

193
86
53
12

(56.3 %)
(25.0 )
(15.5. )
( 3.2 )

1,003
287
12
18

(76.0 %)
(21. 7 )
( 0.9 )
( 1.4 )

219
1,082
10
9

(16.8
(81.9
( 0.7
( 0.6

2.Women should stay out of politics.
Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

58
209
69
8

(16.9
(60.8
(20.1
( 2.2

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

3.Science has limits and may be wrong.
Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

236
23
55
30

(68.6 %)
( 6.7 )
(16.0 )
( 8.7 )

641
605
61
13

(48.6 %)
(45.8 )
( 4.6 )
( 1.0 )

4.People should pay more attention to new ideas.
Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

89
28
16
11

(84.0 %)
( 8.1 )
( 4.7 )
( 3.2 )

880
386
40
14

(66.7 %)
(29.2 )
( 3.0 )
( 1.1 )

553
681
72
14

(41.9 %)
(51.6 )
( 5.5 )
( 1.0 )

5.Equality has gone too far in this country.
Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

144
91
89
20

(41.9 %)
(26.5 )
(25.8 )
( 5.8 )

6.All but the handicapped and old should take care of themselves.
Agree
Disagree
Undecided
No Answer

256
55
22
11

(74.4 %)
(16.0 )
( 6.4 )
( 3.2 )

603
684
24
11

(45.7 %)
(51.8 )
( 1.8 )
( 0.7 )
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that egalitarian value preferences are associated with authoritarian
1

aggression.
The strong support (84 per cent) for the "openness to new ideas"
(item 4) was somewhat unexpected because authoritarianism has been
viewed to be associated with conservative orientations.

The frequency

distribution indicates that Koreans are highly authoritarian in submission-aggression orientation but are very much open to new values.
This seems to contradict the original hypothesis about the rigidity
(conventionalism, superstitiousness, and stereotyping) of authoritarian personality (Adorno et al.,1950); and also not compatible with
the assumptions of the researchers who found close association between
authoritarianism and dogmatism or conservatism (Rokeach, 1956 & 1967).
A close examination of the current data revealed that the "openness to
new ideas" item also has a strong relationship with aggression/submis2

sion items.

This may indicate that those who are open to new ideas are

susceptible to suggestion in the name of "the new."

Also, authorita-

rians may support egalitarian values as a function of aggression or
susceptibility to "new ideas."

Table V.2. Pearson Correlation Among 6 Items
item 1
youth
item
item
item
item
item
item

1
2
3
4
5
6

1.00
-.09
0.22
0.35
0.17
0.28

item 2
women

item 3
science

item 4
ideas

1.00
0.31
0.39
0.10
0.26

1.00
0.51
0.32
0.28

1.00
0.27
0.47

item 5
equality

1.00
0.33

item 6
welfare

1.00
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However, "openness to new ideas" may not reflect psychological
disposition alone.

Inkeles argues that "openness to new experience"

is a part of modernity syndrome, a complex and diffuse personal quality manifested in attitudes, values, and behaviors.

Evne the permis-

siveness of women's rights is a part of the modernity syndrome (1974,
p.109, 291).

We cannot affirm that psychological disposition stands

alone as the indicator of "openness to new ideas" or "permissiveness
of women's rights."
The intercorrelations among the six authoritarian items is not
high, and item 2 (women's political participation) and item 5 (against
too much equality) have negative or weak relationships with the other
four items (Table V.2).

A reliability test shows that the Alpha co3
efficient among the six items is 69.5. The Authoritarianism Index,
constructed on the basis of cumulative scores of the six items into a
unidimensional measure as originally planned, did not work out despite
numerous computations.

This index showed no significant differences

between male and female respondents in the dependent variables, nor
in other major variables such as Organizational Index.
If we accept the criticisms that Adorno's F-scale measures only
authoritarianism on the right (E. Shils, 1954) and sets up a false dichotomy without specifying authoritarians on the left (Knutson, 1972),
then item 2 (openness to women's political participation) and item 4
(openness to new ideas) seem to be measuring a liberal-conservative
dimension in addition to aggression-submission.
Rokeach suggests that authoritarians may conform to whatever institutional norms which prevail, even those advocating egalitarianism.
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He cites that in Israel highly dogmatic subjects rank equality higher,
while in the U.S. dogmatists rank equality lower (1973, pp.114-15).
Clear arguments for the inclusion of the left and center in the
analysis of political extremism can be found in the review of political history by Lipset et al. (1960).

Also, C. Bay (1970, p. 206)

gives a rationale as to why authoritarians can be both conservative
and liberal.
Therefore, in the current research, liberalism/conservatism is
taken as another dimension of personality traits, with an assumed
close association with authoritarianism.

Although there is some con-

ceptual weakness with the limited number of authoritarian items, and
there is no way to determine to what extent the six items are measuring psychological dispositions vs. cultural values, the Authoritarianism Index constructed of four items and the Liberalism Index made of
two items emerged as the best choices from the current data (see Appendix I.5 for index construction).
B. Participation in Voluntary Organizations
Organizational membership of the respondents is largely limited
to Korean ethnic organizations, with Korean churches dominating and
very few joining American organizations.

Sixty-three per cent of the

respondents have at least one organizational membership, while 37 perj
cent have no membership in any organization (Table V.3).

More than

two-thirds (68.2 per cent) do not hold any positions as officers in
those organizations and 31.8 per cent hold one such position (Table
V.4.).

Less than one-fourth (22.7 per cent) participate frequently
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in organizational meetings, while 56.3 per cent do not participate at
all (Table V.5.).
The current data support the findings by Huhr and Kim (1978)

/,~

about the high ethnic organization involvement by Korean immigrants in
the U.S.

They interpreted the high ethnic organizational involvement

by Koreans as an indication of ethnic confinement and saw this as a
4
mode adaptation of immigrants ('adhesive adaptation').
The degree of organization involvement varies widely depending on
the types of organizations; 33.8 per cent have memberships in churchrelated organizations with 19.5 per cent holding offices in these organizations.

Frequent participation is also highest in church-related

organizations.

The next most popular organization is college alumni

Table V.3. Organization Memberships
Number of Orgs.
Belong to
none
one
two
three to six
Total

cases
127
109
55
53
344

per cent
37.0 %
31.8
15.7
15.5
100.0

Table V.4. Organization Office Holders
Number of Positions
none
one
two to six
Total

cases
234
74
36
344

per cent
68.2 %
21.6
10.2
100.0

I
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associations with a membership rate of 22.4 per cent.

Although the

.·/

Korean Association has been recognized as the most inclusive organization and the provincial organizations claim the most basic communal
ties with the old homeland, affiliations to these organizations are
very low (Table V.6.).
Authoritarianism is not significantly related to organization
involvement except that liberals hold slightly more organizational
offices than conservatives (Gamma= -.17).

Organizational involvement

(in membership) is lower among females(Gamma= -.21) and highest among

Table.V.5. Organization Participation
Degree of
Participation

cases

of ten
occasionally
not at all
Total

78
73
193
344

per cent
22.7 %
21.0
56.3
100.0

Table V.6. Affiliation by Types of Organizations
(in per cent)
Types of orgs.
provincial
high school alumni
college alumni
church related
service oriented
professional
Korean Association
others

member

officer

5.8
14.9
22.4
33.8
8.7
14.3
13.7
7.9

0.3
4 .1
6.4
19.6
6.4
4.4
3.5
3.2

frequent attendance
0.9
6.1
8.5
33.5
7.6
7.9
5.5
5.0
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the age group in their 40s (60 per cent), followed by the age group
in their 30s (46.1 per cent).

Educational attainment (Gamma=.18) and

occupational status are significantly related to organizational membership (Gamma= -.30).

Better-educated professionals are more likely be

to involved in organizations than less educated or blue-collar workers.
Naturalized U.S. citizens have higher organizational involvement (Gamma= .34) than alien residents.

Years of residence in the U.S. is posi-

tively related to organizational involvement (Gamma=.32).
C. Political Efficacy
The concept of political efficacy has been present in most theories and researches of political participation for the last 30 years.
However, the concept and measure of political efficacy suffer from
major shortcomings.
In the civic culture of Almond and Verba (1963, 16), political
culture has three dimensions (cognitive, affective, evaluative) and
four different objects as political actors (system as general object;
personal input object; system output object; and self as civic object).
But the researchers who followed the Survey Research Center (especially
the three-wave panel Election Study of 1972-74-76) have focused on the
affective orientation toward the self and the system as political actors.
The efficacy variables of the SRC researches are centered on internal
efficacy, external efficacy, and political trust which rougly correspond to input affect, output affect and system affect of the original
design of Almond and Verba (S. Craig, 1979, Abramson, 1983).

These

three variables have independent roots and do not appear closely inter-
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wined although they are the measures of diffuse support for the political system (Iyengar, 1980).

There is a trend toward reducing the

questionnaire items to the minimum, and some researchers do not distinguish between internal and external efficacy (Abramson, 1983).
The current study adopted the variables close to the original
design by Almond and Verba.

In the present chapter we shall deal with

the generalized attitudes (affective orientation in particular) toward
(a) the political system as a whole, its virtues and accomplishments
(system affect); (b) the feelings of individuals toward themselves
being subject to the civic duties (civic affect); (c) the expectations
people have of treatment at the hands of government officials (output
affect); and (d) the feelings people have about those governmental
agencies as well as their ability to influence the enactment of policies (input affect).
1. System Affect
Almond and Verba, in their original study (1963) of civic culture,
measured responses on 10 different aspects of system affect.

In the

current survey, only four out of those items were chosen (for brevity,
by eliminating the items which are not suitable for the Koreans) and
were constructed into the System Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.a).
About two-thirds of the current sample has high system affect.
This result shows that Koreans (in America) have higher system affect,
when compared with other national or ethnic samples, such as Japanese-

6
Americans or the Western five nations.

Sixty-three per cent of our

Korean-Americans (including non-citizens) have a high regard for the
democratic political system of the U.S.

The social welfare system,
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economic system, and the technology-military power of America are
respected in more than two-thirds of the current sample (Table V.7).
The relatively high esteem for the American governmental system
7

has solid roots in the history of Korea (the South Korean Republic).
Through the past century of mutual contact, Koreans (of the South) have
always perceived Americans as wealthy, strong, and friendly, even as a
rescuer in crises like the Korean War or in internal political tumoil.
And broad cultural graftings with the United States after World War II
have greatly contributed to the formation of high system affect of this
immigrant group for the U.S. and its political system.

Table V.7. Confidence in the U.S. Political System
by Korean Respondents
Aspects of
U.S.Government
democracy
social welfare
economy
industry/defense

degree of pride and respect
very much

somewhat

not at all

missing

total

63.0 %
60.3
72.0
68.8

27.7 %
31,5
20.1
22.4

4.1 %
3.2
3.2
3.2

5.2 %
5.0
4.7
5.5

100.0 %
100.0
100.0
100.0

The examination of the System Affect Index reveals that females
have a slightly higher system affect than do males (Gamma=.14) and the
better-educated respondents have a weaker system affect (Gamma=-.24).
Age and citizenship status do not make any difference in system affect,
although the length of residence in the U.S. has a weak positive relationship to system affect.
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2. Civic Affect
Civic affect is the affective orientation toward oneself as a
political object.

It comprises one's feelings of being obliged to per-

form citizen's duties in the political system and feelings of capability to handle such obligations.

Although civic affect is one of the

four political orientations in Almond and Verba's original concepts,
it has been gradually eliminated as the efficacy measures got simpler.
The current respondents' sense of civic duty is very low.

Of the

four selected items, the most satisfying civic duty is voting, yet only
41 per cent of the respondents would vote with satisfaction, and 37 per
cent would serve on a jury with satisfaction.

Only 18 per cent felt

satisfied with paying taxes and 11 per cent with registration for military draft for themselves or for their sons.
On the Civic Affect Index (Appendix I.3.b), only 31.1 per cent
showed high civic affect.
(Gamma=-.30).

Females have lower civic affect than do males

Educational attainment (Gamma=.17) and age have weak

positive relationship with civic affect.

Those who have lived longer

in the U.S. and naturalized citizens are more likely to accept civic
duties than are alien residents (Gamma=.18).

However, civic affect

Table V.8.Civic Affect(Sense of Citizen's Duty)
satisfied
pay taxes
vote
serve on jury
draft registration

17.5 %
41.4
37.3
11.1

do as duty
74.1 %
37.0
28.3
59.5

feel annoyed

missing

total

4.1 %
6.1
15.2
11. 7

4.4 %
15.5
19.2
17.8

100.0 %
100.0
100.0
100.0
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seems not to be a function of length of exposure to the demand of civic
duties.

Among low and moderate civic affect groups, those who have lived

longer in the U.S. tend to express more civic affect than those who have
lived here only briefly.

But among the high civic affect group, years

of residence in the U.S. do not make any difference.
Although Koreans have been educated to cherish a deep sense of
civic duty (taxation, national defense, and education are three such
basic duties in Korea), it seems that their civic affect has not been
fully transferred to the new adopted country (Table V.8.).
It is also possible that the respondents, having escaped from
the external constraints of the homeland which continuously demanded
loyalty, harmony and national consolidation (so-called Gook-Min-ChongWha), are now experiencing a vacuum in their sense of of civic duties
in a more voluntaristic system.

In Korea, tax officers visit homes

to collect taxes, nonvoters are informally sanctioned, military draftees are preregistered through vital records, and jury selection is
not open to the public.

A cultural transition from such a background

takes time.
3. Input Affect
Another dimension of political competence is the input affect
or internal efficacy which denotes one's belief and feelings that he
can exercise some influence in the course of governmental decisions.
It makes a great difference in one's political participation whether
someone has a clear view of the channels open to him for expressing
his point of view or has not even the vaguest notion of what he can do.
In order to detect the respondents' input affect, the respond-
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ents were asked which strategies they would choose in order to change
the legislature at local or federal levels and how confident they were
about achieving their goals.

Because the Korean government has no

differentiation between local and federal levels and the respondents
have little sense of such differentiation, they were treated as a single entity in the current study.
For the Korean respondents in the current survey, voting is the
most preferred strategy of input to the government.

Voting was chosen

by 49.4 per cent of the respondents, but 25.5 per cent would choose
other strategies in addition to voting (the respondents were allowed
to make more than one choice).
Considering that one fifth would do nothing and that 23.9 per
cent would depend on voting alone, almost half of the respondents seem
to be passive in the process of political inputs, although 79 per cent
would do something.
Koreans are less likely to act with other people, or through
groups or formal organizations.

Only 13 per cent would do that in

Table V.9. Input Affect A. (Actions to be Taken)
Actions to be taken to correct legislation
do nothing
write or talk to politicians
work through groups
vote
vote and other actions too
protest activities
Total

N
66
32
41
75
80
20
314

More than one choice was allowed for this question.
Missing cases=30

Per Cent
21.0 %
10.2
13.0
23.9
25.5

6.4
100.0
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their input attempts, and directly contacting (writing or talking to)
politicians was chosen by only 10 per cent of the Korean sample.

This
8

rate is also lower than that for other national or ethnic samples.
Intended protest activities as the form of their own expression of input are chosen by 6.4 per cent, but this rate is much lower than their
approval rate of others' protest activities.

"Taking some violent

action" or "just protest" are more likely to happen with Koreans than
with other nationals.

Also, even among those who would not involve

themselves in protest, one-fourth approved such activities by others
(further discussions in Chapter V).
The feelings about the possibility of succeeding in these input
efforts are moderately high among the respondents of the current study.
Two-thirds feel they are likely to succeed in their attempts, while
24 per cent believe it to be impossible (Table V.10).
On the Input Affect Index (see Appendix I.3.c) only one-fourth
(26.4 per cent) of the respondents showed high input affect.

This rate

is much lower than the rates of Americans but comparable to four other
9
Western nationals.

Table V.10 Input Affect B. (Possibility of Success)
Likely to succeed in Influencing the change of regulations
Very Likely
Somewhat Likely
Somewhat Impossible
Absolutely Impossible
Total
Missing cases=41

N

%

28
193

9.2
63.7
16.S
10.6
100.0

50

32
303
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Age has a negative relationship to input affect(Gamma=-.10) and
females have a lower input affect than do males (Gamma= -.28).

The

better-educated respondents have a higher input affect (Gamma=.16).
Those who have lived longer in the U.S. have a significantly higher
input affect than those who have lived more briefly in the U.S. (Gamma
=.25), consequently, U.S. citizens have a higher input affect than do
the resident aliens (Gamma=.32).
4. Output Affect
The feeling that people have toward governmental authorities
may be inf erred from their expectations of how they will be treated
by the government officials.
thetical situations.

The respondents were placed in two hypo-

They were asked to imagine themselves making

inquiries to government officials on problems of different magnitude
(such as tax questions, immigration problems, or police traffic ticket).

And they were asked if they could get equal treatment to any-

one else.

Half the respondents (52.4 per cent) expected they would

get equal treatment from government officials.

This proportion is

lower than among Americans; 90 per cent of whites and 49 per cent of

Table V.11. Output Affect (Equal treatment from Authorities)

Surely equal treatment
I may get equal treatment
It depends
May be not
They will ignore
Total

N

Per Cent

108

32.3 %
20.1
21.3
26.0
0.3
100.0

67
71

87
1
334

Treatment by government officials or police were combined.
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blacks expected equal treatment by government officials; while 85 per
cent of whites and 60 per cent of blacks expected equal treatment by
the police (Abromowitz, 1980).

Also, same expectations in the current

sample are lower than what Almond and Verba found earlier in Western
10
nations sample (1963). The reason for such low expectation may have
roots in the Korean political culture of a deep elite-mass gap (further discussion in Chapter VII).
On the second question, asking the respondents how seriously

their points of view would be considered by authorities, a similar
pattern emerged.

Only 30.6 per cent of the current sample thought

their opinions would be seriously considered by the officials.
On the Output Affect Index (Appendix I.3.d), 45.5 per cent of

all respondents showed high output affect.

This rate seems to be

higher than the proportion of high external efficacy among Americans
(33.9 per cent in 1980 Election Study by ICPSR) but the two measure11
ments are not identical.
Males tended to have lower output affect than did females (Gamma

Table V.12. Output Affect (Expectations toward Officials)

They will
They will
Depends
They will
They will

seriously consider
pay some attention
say nothing
ignore

Total
Missing case=l7

N

Per Cent

100
124
91
3
9

30.6 %
37.9
27.8
0.9
2.8

327

100.0
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=.18), and young respondents in their 20s had a lower ouput affect
than their elders.

Education was positively related to output affect

(Gamma=.16) but occupational status and income were not linearly related to ouput affect.

The time of sojourn in the U.S. was positively

related to output affect (Gamma=.28); consequently, naturalized U.S.
citizens had higher output affect than resident aliens (Gamma=.21).
D. Authoritarianism, Organizational Participation and
Political Efficacy
In the preceding section, we found that the Korean-American respondents have high system affect, while having low input, output and
civic affect.

In this section we will examine whether their organi-

zational participation had any effect on their political efficacy with
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Among authoritarians, those who participate
in voluntary organizations have higher political competence than
authoritarians who do not participate in voluntary organizations,
in terms of their affect about one's own position as a political
subject, about one's ability to influence the political system,
about the output responses by the political system and about the
national political system as a whole.
When authoritarianism is coded as a dichotomous variable, its
relationships with system affect and civic affect appear clearly negative as postulated; but it does not vary much with output affect or
with input affect.

If the liberal/conservative dimension is examined

simultaneously, the relationship between authoritarianism and input or
output affect appears distinctively as postulated (Figure V.1).
As was hypothesized, the data suggest that the Organizational
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Index (Appendix I.2.c) has a modifying effect on the relationship between authoritarianism and political efficacy.

Comparison of Gammas

reveals the following patterns (Figure V.1. and Table V.13):
i) Liberals who participate in organizations are more likely
to have high political affect (except output affect) than nonparticipants whether they are authoritarian or not.
ii) Conservative nonauthoritarians who participate in organizations have high political affect on all four efficacy indices.

Figure V.1. Authoritarianism and Political Affect (Gammas)
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civic affect
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output affect !======== 0.17
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Conservatives

Tables.V.13.

Organizational Index and Political Affect (Gammas)
Political Affect
System
Civic

Input

Output

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

.22 (.21)
.16 (.18)

.18 (.27)
.02 ( .07)

.29 (.28)
.38 (.51)

-.35 (-.22)
-.16 (-.21)

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

.76 (.80)
-.11 (-.12)

.61 (.58)
.04 (.08)

.34 (.35)
.16 (.18)

.44 (.44)
.06 (.04)

Gammas in parentheses are the strength of relationship with
Organizational Membership, instead of with the Organizational Index.
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But the increase in political efficacy is smaller among conservative authoritarians than nonauthoritarians.
The above patterns of relationships are further explored con
trolling organizational involvement:
1. Authoritarianism and System Affect
There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism
and system affect (Gannna= -.10).

Authoritarians have a lower mean

system affect (2.52) than nonauthoritarians (2.62), supporting the
general postulates.

When the liberal/conservative dimension is con-

trolled, conservative authoritarians showed a lower system affect
than nonauthoritarians but liberal authoritarians showed higher system
affect than nonauthoritarians (Table V.14).
Organizational participation generally increases system affect
for the current respondents (Gamma=.15), especially for all liberals
12
and nonauthoritarian conservatives; organizational members have a
higher mean system affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3a).

As shown in Table V.15 in the case of liberal authoritarians,

Table V.14. Authoritarianism and System Affect ( % )
System Affect Index
Moderate
High

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

8.0
8.5

38.0
29.3

54.0
62.2

Row Total
176
100.0 ( 59)
100.0 (117)

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

7.1
4.1

21.4
37.8

71.4
58.1

116
99.9 ( 42)
100.0 ( 74)

Low

Missing Cases=52/ Gamma for Liberal -.01/ for Conservative -.23
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organizational participants are more represented in the moderate or
high system affect category than nonorganizational respondents, clearly in the direction of supporting Hypothesis 1.

In the case of con-

servative authoritarians, the results are opposite to the current hypothesis, for some unkown reason.

Table V.15.

Organization Involvement and System Affect
Low

System Affect (Per Cent)
Moderate
High
Row Total

Liberal Authoritarian
Organization Membership
None
10.2
One or Two
0
More than Two
0

28.6
41.5
25.9

61.2
58.5
74.1

100.0 (N=49)
100.0 (N=41)
100.0 (N=27)

30.3
40.0
47.6

63.6
55.0
52.4

100.0 (N=33)
100.0 (N=20)
100.0 (N=21)

Conservative Authoritarian
Organization Membership
None
6.1
One or Two
5.0
More than Two
0

2. Authoritarianism and Civic Affect
There is a weak negative relationship between authoritarianism
and civic affect (Gamma= -.15).

The mean civic affect of authoritari-

ans (2.27) is lower than that of nonauthoritarians (2.33), supporting
the general postulates about authoritarianism (Table V.16). The negative relationship is upheld when the liberal/conservative dimension of
authoritarianism is controlled (Gamma= -.13 for liberals and -.18 for
conservatives, respectively).

The mean civic affect of the conserva-
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tives (2.29) is not much different from that of the liberals (2.30).
Those who were involved in organizations expressed a slightly
higher civic affect than nonparticipants (Gamma=.13), although the
difference of mean civic affect between organizational members and
nonmembers is very small (Figure V.3b).
The strength of the relationship between organizational member-

Table V.16.

Authoritarianism and Civic Affect ( % )
Low

Civic Affect Index
Moderate
High

Ll.beral
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

3.8
2.9

60.4
68.6

35.8
28.6

Row Total
158
100.0 ( 53)
100.1 (105)

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
authoritarians

5.3
0

55.3
73.2

39.5
26.8

100.1
100.0

109
(38)
(71)

Missing Cases= 77/ Gamma for Ll.berals -.13/ Conservatives

-.18

Table V.17. Organizational Membership & Civic Affect ( % )
Low

Civic Affect (in Per Cent)
Moderate
High
Row Total

Ll.beral Authoritarians
Organization Membership
None
2.4
One or Two
2.6
4.0
More than two

73.8
63.2
68.0

23.8
34.2
28.0

100.0 (N=42)
100.0 (N=38)
100.0 (N=25)

76.5
66.7
73.7

23.5
33.3
26.3

100.0 (N=34)
100.0 (N=18)
100.0 (N=l9)

Conservative Authoritarians
Organization Membership
0
None
0
One or Two
0
More than Two
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ship and civic affect, measured by Gamma coefficients, is very weak.
But the frequency distribution (Table V.17) clearly shows that organizational members have higher civic affect than nonmembers, even when
13
authoritarianism and liberal/conservatism are considered.
Although the number of organizational memberships is not linearly
related to civic affect, the data weakly confirm the direction of the
relationship as stated in Hypothesis 1.
3. Authoritarianism and Input Affect
There is little difference of mean input affect between authoritarians (2.03) and nonauthoritarians (2.01), although authoritarians
tended to show a slightly lower input affect than nonauthoritarians.
The liberals had a slightly higher mean input affect (2.10) than the
conservatives (1.92).

But when the liberal/conservative dimension is

controlled, liberal authoritarians showed lower input affect than nonauthoritarians (Gamma= -.24), while conservative authoritarians showed
higher input affect than nonauthoritarians (Gamma=20).

This pattern

supports the general postulates 'of authoritarianism in the case of
liberal authoritarians, while conservative authoritarians showed a
relationship opposite to such postulates (Table V.18).
Organizational involvement significantly increases input affect
for all respondents (Gamma=.30).

Organizational members have higher

mean input affect than nonmembers (Figure V.3c).

The positive effect

of organizational involvement is sustained for both authoritarians and
nonauthoritarians alike, and regardless of their being liberal or con14
servative. Among those who are highly involved in organizations, the
proportion of high input affect is much higher and the proport2on of
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low input affect is lower than among nonorganizational members (Table
V.19).

Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported in the case of input affect.

Especially with liberal authoritarians the hypothesized pattern appears
clearly.
4. Authoritarianism and Output Affect
There is little difference in mean output affect between nonauthoritarians (2.17) and authoritarians (2.15).

When the liberal/conser-

Table V.18. Authoritarianism and Input Affect ( % )

Low

Input Affect
Moderate

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

High

14.8
22.5

50.0
54.1

35.2
23.4

Row Total
165
100.0 ( 44)
100.0 (111)

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

38.5
30.6

43.6
40.3

17.9
29.2

111
100.0 ( 39)
100.0 ( 72)

Missing Cases= 68; Gammas, Liberal= -.24/ Conservative= .20

Tables V.19. Organizational Membership & Input Affect ( % )

Low
Liberal Authoritarians
Organization Membership
None
One or Two
More than Two

Input Affect (in Per Cent)
Moderate
High

Row Total

32.6
23.7
3.7

56.5
55.3
48.1

10.9
21.1
48.1

100.0 (N=46)
100.1 (N=38)
99.9 (N=21)

Conservative Authoritarians
Organization Membership
None
38.2
One or Two
38.9
More than Two
10.0

32.4
33.3
60.0

29.4
27.8
30.0

100.0 (N=34)
100.0 (N=l8)
100.0 (N=20)
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vative dimension is controlled, liberal authoritarians tended to show
lower output affect than nonauthoritarians, as in the general postulation, but the opposite was true among the conservatives (Table V.20).
Organizational involvement alone seems not to increase output
affect, although there is a small difference in mean output affect
between organizational members and nonmembers (Figure V.3d).

When the

liberal/conservative dimension was controlled, the relationship between

Table V.20. Authoritarianism and Out:Eut Affect

Low
Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian
Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian
Missing Cases = 47:

Output Affect
Moderate
High

27.6
34.S

32.8
32.8

39.7
32.8

47.7
34.2

2S.O
27.6

27.3
38.2

Gammas

Row Total
177
100.1 ( S8)
100.1 (119)
120
100.0 ( 44)
100.0 ( 76)

Liberal= -.20, Conservative=.17

Table V.21. Organizational MembershiE & Out:Eut Affect ( % )

Low

Output Affect
Moderate

30.0
29.3

so.a

30.0
41.S
2S.O

40.0
29.3
2S.O

100.0 (N=SO)
100 .1 (N=41)
100.0 (N=28)

Conservative Authoritarians
Org. Membership
None
38.9
One or Two
30.0
More than Two
30.0

2S.O
20.0
40.0

so.a

36.1

100.0 (N=36)
100.0 (N=20)
100.0 (N=20)

Liberal Authoritarians
Org. Membership
None
One or Two
More than Two

High

30.0

Row Total

68

organizational involvement and output affect became clearly negative
15
among liberals but positive among conservatives.
Although the strength of the relationship is too small to claim
a clear-cut support for Hypothesis 1, the case of conservative authoritarians shows a pattern that partially fits the hypothesis; but
the case of the liberal authoritarians contradicts Hypothesis 1 as far
as output affect is concerned (Table V.15).
Summary
On the six authoritarian items, Korean respondents showed a high-

er degree of authoritarian aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egalitarianism than Americans but the inter-correlations among the six items
were not high.

Authoritarian on the left and right should be identi-

fied because they manifested different traits.

Organizational involve-

ment of the respondents was very high but limited to ethnic organizations, indicating ethnic confinement in structural assimilation.

The

data did not support the general assumption that authoritarianism is
negatively related to organizational participation.
Korean-Americans have a high regard for the U.S. governmental
system and their system affect is higher than that shown among the
samples of five Western nations (including the U.S.).

On the contrary,

their sense of citizens' duty being subject to the government (civic
affect) is very low.

This may be a result of their passive defiance

(see Korean Political Culture in Chapter VII), inasmuch as they were
accustomed to their homeland government which exercised many external
constraints, and now they are in a vacuum of such constraints in this
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voluntaristic society.
Input affect is relatively low among the Korean-Americans.

Almost

half of the respondents feel passive about influencing governmental
policies and Koreans are least likely to act with other people.

Their

trait of distrusting others, as a syndrome of authoritarianism, and
their difficulty in working with other people may have contributed to
their low input affect and also to low output affect.
The time factor and citizenship are positively related to all
items of political efficacy, indicating the progress of political acculturation.

The findings presented in this section can be summarized

in the following points (Figure V.2.):
i) The relationship between organizational involvement and
political affect is stronger (even when negative) among nonauthoritarians than authoritarians on all four political affect items.
Despite the effect of organizational involvement, authoritarians
do have lower political efficacy than nonauthoritarians.
ii) With liberal authoritarians, the hypothesized relationship
that even authoritarians have higher political affect if they are
involved in organizations was found with system affect and very
weakly with civic affect, in addition it has been supported with
input affect but not with output affect.
iii) With conservative authoritarians, the hypothesized relationship was found with input affect, weakly with civic and output
affect, except the case of system affect.
The findings generally support the participationist thesis and
also Hypothesis 1.

The above pattern shows that the conservative

authoritarians whom the original researchers of the F-scale (Adorno
et al.) dealt with as authoritarians could have higher input and output affect, contradicting their hypothesis.

But the liberals whom

they did not differentiate in their studies seem to fall in the response patterns that they predicted.

Therefore, it is only liberal
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authoritarians who are reacting as "alienated political subjects,"
while the conservative authoritarians remain as "allegiant participants" (Almond andVerba, 1963).

Figure.V.2. Sununary: Authoritarianism, Organizational
And Political Affects
Postulates
Authoritarianism

Hypotheses
Org. Involvement

System Affect

supported

Civic Affect

supported

Input Affect

supported
(Liberals only)
supported
(Liberals only)

Output Affect

Involvement
Variance
Explained
5.2 %

supported
(Liberals only)
supported
(weakly)
supported

8.5 %

not supported

9.3 %

6.7 %

NOTES
1. In the cross-tabulation between the item 2 and item 6, fourfifths (79 %) of those who supported women's political participation
agreed on authoritarian item 6 ("all but the handicapped and old should
take care of themselves"), indicating that the majority of egalitarians
are aggressive. And 65 % of the aggressive respondents (on item 6)
supported women's political rights. In the cross-tabulation between
item 2 and item 3 (science has its limitation), again 80 % of those
who supported women's political rights express superstitiousness. And
69 per cent of the superstitious respondents supported women's political rights.
2. Item 4 (openness to new ideas) is not only related to the
egalitarian item (item 2; Gamma=.44) but also to aggressiveness/submissiveness items. For instance, 92 % of those who expressed aggressiveness on item 1 support the openness to new ideas. And 62 per cent
of the open-minded respondents on item 4 are highly aggressive on item
1 (Gamma=.45). Item 4 has a very strong relationship (Ganuna=.80) with
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item 3 (superstitiousness). It indicates that the respondents who
agreed on these two items expressed susceptibility to suggestions by
others and not only the openness to liberal ideas. Again the relationship between item 4 and item 6 is very strong (Gamma=.65). In here,
the 'open minded' respondents are more aggressive in claiming selfsupport by the able-bodied.
3. If the 30 missing cases are excluded, the Alpha coefficient
is reduced to 46.1).
4. Hurh and Kim found more intense ethnic confinement in Los
Angeles area; ie. 76.1 % were participating in Korean organizations
(78.6 % of them were affiliated with Korean churches), and only 0.5
% were affiliated with American associations (1984, pp. 95-97).
5. Labor unions were not included in the questionnaire and church involvements were excluded from the computation of organization
indices, because church membership was so prevalent and could have
been duplicated with other memberships.
6. Bunch's interview of 212 Japanese-Americans in Portland,
Oregon, 1967 and D.B. Conradt's German data of 1978 can be compared
as follows:
High Regard for Political System (percentage)
Korean-Americans
Political System
Social Legislation
Economic System
Contribution to Science

63 %
60
72
69

Japanese-Americans
65 %
4
34
0

Germans
31 %
18
40
23

Although the measurements are not identical, political trust of
the five Western nations surveyed in 1974 is much lower than KoreanAmericans' system affect. The proportion of high political trust
among adults of the five nations is; 36% for the Netherlands, 20% for
Great Britain, 23% for the U.S., 52% for Germany, and 51% for Austria
(Jennings et al.,1979. 480).
7. As mentioned in Chapter IV., North Korea has no formal relationship with the U.S. and cannot send immigrants to the U.S. Even
those Koreans who fled from the North during or before the Korean War
of the 1950s are considered as South Koreans. Therefore, the Koreans
in this study exclude any possible immigrants from the North.
8. "Acting with other people" was chosen with much higher rates
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by Americans 30%; Germans 14 %; Dutch 16%; Japanese 15%; Austrians 3%
(compiled by Conradt, 1980, p. 249); and British 18% (Kavanagh 1980,
p. 150).
9. The proportion of high and medium internal efficacy among
the white Americans was 54% in 1978 and 55% in 1980 (Abramson, 1983,
p. 185). The proportions of high (internal) efficacy among the five
Western national adult samples of 1974 are as follows: Netherland 22%;
Britain 22%; U.S. 41%; Germany 24%; Austria 5% (Alberbeck, 1979).
10. The expectation of equal treatment by officials and police
were also higher among the British, Germans and Italians than in the
current Korean sample. Only Mexicans had lower output affect than
did Koreans. Among the Mexicans, the positive expectation of equal
treatment was 42% for government officials and 32 % for the police.
11. Although input affect and internal efficacy are essentially
the same variables, their measurements adopted are slightly different.
In the Korean sample, the respondents with medium-high input affect
were 45.5% of the total.
12. Among liberal authoritarians, organizational members have
higher system affect than those who do not have organizational membership (Gamma=.16),as well as among liberal nonauthoritarians (Gamma=
Among conservative authoritarians those involved in organizations have lower system affect (Gamma= -.11). But among the conservative nonauthoritarians, system affect is higher for the organizational
members (Gamma=.76).
·
13. Among the nonauthoritarians, civic affect is higher for those
who are involved in organizations both for liberals (Gamma=.18) and
conservatives (Gamma=.61). Even among authoritarians, civic affect
was slightly higher for organizational members, both for liberals
(Gamma=.02) and conservatives (Gamma=.04).
14. The positive relationship is stronger among liberal authoritarians (Gamma=.38) than conservative authoritarians (Gamma=.16).
Among nonauthoritarians, the positive relationship is relatively
stronger for the conservatives (Gamma=.34) than for the liberals
(Gamma=.27).
15. Liberal organization members had lower output affect than do
nonorganizational counterparts(Gamma= -.35 for nonauthoritarians,
Gamma= -.16 for authoritarians). Conservatives who are organizational
members had higher output affect than do the nonorganizational members
(Gamma= .44 for nonauthoritarians, Gamma=.06 for authoritarians).
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Figure.V.3a. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND SYSTEM AFFECT (MEANS)
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Authoritarian
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Authoritarian
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Figure.V.3b. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND CIVIC AFFECT (MEANS)
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Figure.3.2c. ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT AND INPUT AFFECT (MEANS)
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CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE PREFERENCE
A. Political Participation
In the preceding chapter, we have examined the relationship between organizational participation and political efficacy. In general,
higher political efficacy was found among respondents who participated
in voluntary organizations, even among authoritarians.

In this chap-

ter, we shall further examine whether such high political efficacy,
presumably gained by organizational participation, can have an effect
on political participation (namely in electoral process and protest
activities) and on the political issue preferences of the respondents.
Thus, the following hypothesis will be tested in this section:
Hypothesis 2. Among authoritarians, those who participate in
voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are
more likely to participate in the electoral process than those who
do not participate in voluntary organizations.
Preliminary analysis of the data shows that Korean-Americans'
participation on various levels of political action is very low.
This was predicted because only 52.3 per cent of Korean-Americans are
naturalized citizens, although the Asians' naturalization rate is high1

est among the new immigrants.

About two-thirds (61.7 per cent) of

the 180 citizens among the respondents have registered for voting and
48.3 per cent of these citizens voted in the congressional election in
1982 and 37.8 percent did so in the local election of 1983.
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The respondents' participation in the electoral process other
than voting is relatively lower than voting and had to be collapsed
into one response category (Table VI.1).

However, nonvoting activit-

ies are a more active form of participation in the political process
than voting because such participation requires more time, effort, and
money than merely presenting oneself at the polling place on election
day.

There was a tendency for better-educated respondents with white-

collar jobs and with higher income to participate more in the political processes other than voting.

On the Political Participation Index

(see Appendix I.4.a), authoritarianism has little effect (Gamma=.02).
But the relationships between other key variables and the Political
2

Participation Index are confirmed as generally assumed.

Table VI.1. Political Participation of Korean American Citizens
(Comparison with U.S. Voting Rates)
Types of activity
Voting: 82 Congress
Voting: 83 Local
Other Activities*

U.S. Total

Current Sample
48.3
37.8
24.1

(N=l80)
(N=180)
(N=344)**

Chicago City

64.1
82.0

*Political discussion with politicians (N=25), rallies (N=17),
campaign fund donation (N=33), and writing to media (N=8) etc.
** Noncitizens are also involved in nonvoting political actions.

1. Voting in Congressional and Local Elections
About a quarter (25.9 per cent) of the total respondents voted
in the 1982 congressional election.

The total rate seems to be low;

but if only the citizens are considered, voters' registration rate is
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61.7 per cent and the actual voting rate of the registered voters is
78.4 per cent (48.3 per cent of the 180 citizens).

This seems to be-

lie the general perception that Korean-Americans are nonactive voters.
Their registration and voting rate is lower than the U.S. average but
3
higher than that for Hispanics. Authoritarians voted slightly more
in the congressional election than nonauthoritarians.

But this rela-

tionship was very weak, while social status and sex had a greater ef f4
ect on voting.
The voting rate in the local election {Spring, 1983) is lower
than that in the congressional election--only 37.7 per cent of citizens voted.

Authoritarians voted slightly less in the local election

than nonauthoritarians, but the contrast is negligibly small (Gamma
= -.08).

Again, the variables of sex and social status had stronger
5

effects on voting in local elections.
2. Organization Involvement, Political Affect, and Voting
a. System Affect and Voting
For all respondents with citizenship, system affect had a posi-

Table.VI.2. The

Profiles of Voters in Elections
(Gammas)
Congressional Election

More Males than Females:
Better-Educated than less Educated.
Mainly White-collar Employee Activity
Have Lived Longer in the U.S.

Local Election

-.42

-.29

.57

.44

-.33

-.21

.40

.14
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tive relationship with voting in congressional and local elections.
Those with higher system affect voted more in both elections, regard6
less of their degree of authoritarianism.
In the congressional election, authoritarians with system affect
voted more for both liberals (Gamma=.25) and conservatives (Gamma=.20).
The same relationships with similar strengths of association were found
in the local elections (Table VI.3).
When organizational involvement is controlled the following patterns become apparent among the citizens (Table VI.4).
i) Among liberal authoritarians, high system affect is positively related to voting in the congressional election if they are
involved in organizations, but negatively related if they are not
involved in organizations.

Table VI.3. Authoritarianism Political Affect and Voting (Gammas)
Voting in Congressional Elections
System
Liberals
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian
Conservatives
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

Political Affect
Civic
Input

.61
.25

.23
.48

-.02
.24

.65
.20

.58
.30

.36
.26

Output
-.17

.o

.09

.o

Voting in Local Elections
Liberals
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian
Conservatives
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

.o

.24
.25

.42

-.15
.28

.01
-.06

.17
.29

.52
.32

.32
-.04

-.27
.03
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ii) In the local election, the strength of the relationship
between system affect and voting is stronger for the liberal authoritarians involved in organizations than for nonorganizational
members.
iii) With the conservative authoritarians no such pattern was
found. 'Ibose with high organizational involvement did not vote
any more than nonorganizational members in both elections despite
their possibly high system affect.
'!bus, the case of liberal authoritarians clearly supports Hypothesis 2, but that of conservative authoritarians does not.
b. Civic Affect and Voting
For all respondents with citizenship, civic affect is positively
related to voting in the congressional election regardless of authori7
tarianism. A similar relationship was found for the local election,
except for liberal nonauthoritarians, among whom civic affect does not
make any difference in voting (Table VI.3).
Because civic affect already has a positive effect on voting in
both elections, organizational involvement does not intervene in the
relationship between civic affect and voting.

Regardless of their

involvement in organizations, those with high civic affect voted more
both in national and local elections.

And the effect of civic affect

on voting seems not to be different between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians whether they are liberals or conservatives (Tables VI.
3. and VI.4.).

Since overall civic affect is so low, respondents

with high civic affect seem to be those who have the urge to vote to
fulfill their civic duty. 'Iberefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in
the case of civic affect.
c. Input Affect and Voting
Except among liberal nonauthoritarians, input affect is posi-
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tively related to voting in the congressional election.

Authoritari-

ans with high input affect showed a higher voting rate in congressional
election (for the liberals Gamma=.24; for the conservatives Gamma=.26).
But in local election, the voting rate was lower than in congressional
8
election and the effect of input affect was not consistent for authoritarians.

With liberal authoritarians, input affect was manifested in

a higher voting rate (Gamma=.28) but not with conservative authoritarians (Gamma= -.04).
Input affect is positively related to voting in congressional

Table VI.4. Authoritarianism 1 Organizational Involvement
Political Affect 1 and Voting (Gammas)
Voting in Congressional Election
System
Ll..beral Authoritarians
Org. Membership None
One or Two
More than Two
Conservative Authoritarians
Org. Membership None
One or Two
More than Two

Political Affect
Civic
Input

Output

-.10
.60
.11

.74
.07
.48

-.15
.38
.21

-.44
.10
.38

-.07

.71
-.20

.33
.32
.11

-.23
.69
.43

.0
.23

.05
.36
.29

.48
.43
.66

.13
.25
.28

.03
.04
-.19

.47
.76
-.36

.20
.44
.22

-.33
-.41
.54

-.11
.60
..,.,12

.o

Voting in Local Election
Liberal Authoritarians
Org. Membership None
One or Two
More than Two
Conservative Authoritarians
Org. Membership None
One or More
More than Two
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election if respondents are involved in organizations, both for liberal
and conservative authoritarians (Table VI.4).

In the local election,

that positive relationship was also found among liberal authoritarians
but faltered a little bit among conservative authoritarians.

However,

the general direction is that even authoritarians, those who participate in organizations are more likely to vote with high input affect.
Organizational involvement further enhances the relationship between input affect and voting in the congressional election for authoritarians (both liberal and conservative), supporting Hypothesis 2.
d. Output Affect and Voting
High output affect itself alone is not positively related to
participation in voting with the citizens in the current sample.
Authoritarians voted more than nonauthoritarians in the congressional
election, if they had high output affect, both for the liberals (Gamma

9
= -17) and the conservatives (Gamma= -.27).
Organizational involvement intervenes in the effect of output
affect on voting in congressional election for liberal authoritarians,
clearly supporting Hypothesis 3.
conservative authoritarians.

That relationship is weaker among

No such pattern is found in local elec-

tion (Table VI.4).
3. Nonconventional Participation--Protest Activities
Although it was not clearly stated in Hypothesis 2 about protest
activities as unconventional political participation, they were a part
of the agenda in the current study.

As was mentioned in the introduc-

tion to this dissertation, Koreans have been exposed to a political
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ethos in which protest activities are perceived as a routinized form
of political participation because direct voting rights have been
withheld on many occasions.

Therefore, Hypothesis 2 can be rephrased

as follows:
Hypothesis 2.a. Among authoritarians, those who participate in
voluntary organizations and have higher political efficacy are more
likely to approve political protest than those who do not participate in voluntary organizations.
In the current survey, four types of protest activities were
proposed to respondents, who were asked whether they approved or disapproved of such activities.

Responses to those items (Table VI.5)

made up a composite Protest Index (see Appendix I.4.b).

Table.VI.5. Res Eons es Protest Items (percentage)
Disapprove
Protest letters to politicians

Depends

Approve

39.6%

58.1%

2.3%

Demonstration and Marching

15.1

52.8

32.1

Disobeying Unjust Government

17.0

38.7

44.3

Violent Protest

27.5

44.6

27.9

The current data revealed that Koreans are highly prone to approve of protest activities compared to respondents to a five Western
nations' sample (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. pp.69-82).

Although the two
10
sets of measurements may not be exactly compatable, the Korean respendents were more likely to approve protest letters and disobeying

unjust government than any of the five Western nationals.

Koreans are
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more likely to approve of demonstrations and violent form of protest
11
than Americans, British, or Germans.
On the Protest Index, higher protest potential was found among
12
younger males, better-educated, and nonprofessionals. Authoritarianism alone had little effect on protest approval but when the liberal/conservative dimension of authoritarianism was controlled, liberals were found more likely to approve of protests than conservatives
(Gamma= -.16), as in the following patterns (Tables VI.6 and VI.7):
i) Liberal nonauthoritarians were less prone to protest if
they had high system, civic and output affects.
ii) Liberal authoritarians were more prone to protest if they
had high system and civic affects but low input and output affects.
iii) Conservative nonauthoritarians were more prone to protest
if they had high system, input and output affects.
iv) Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve
protest if they had high civic and input affects.
Liberal authoritarians were more likely to approve protests when
they had high regard for the political system and when they were performing civic duties with loyalty, but they did not see the govern-

Table VI.6 Protest AQQroval by Authoritarianism (Percentage)

Low

Protest Index
Moderate
High

Row Total

Liberals
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians

1.8
1.0

52.7
55.0

45.5
44.0

100 ( N = 55)
100 ( N = 102)

Conservatives
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians

2.6
3.0

68.4
64.2

28.9
32.8

100 ( N = 40)
100 ( N = 68)

84
ment's fair treatment nor did they feel confident about their ability
to influence the political process.
Conservative authoritarians were more likely to approve protests
when they performed their civic duties with loyalty and felt that they
could influence the political processes; but they did not feel that
the government and politicians were doing their part.

Approval of

protest activities was more likely to happen with the respondents who
had higher system affect (Gamma=.11), civic affect (Gamma=.21) and input affect (Gamma =.17), but not output affect (Gamma=.02)
Those who participated in organizations were slightly more likely to approve protests (Gamma=.13).

The Protest Index shows that or-

ganizational participation does not, in a specific pattern, intervene
in the effects of political efficacy on approving protest activities.
Even among those who are not involved in organizations, all four political efficacy items have positive effects on protest approval.

Table VI.7 Protest AEEroval br Authoritarianism
(Gammas)

System
Liberal
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians
Conservatives
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

& Political Affect

Political Affect
Civic
Input

Output

-.19
.36

-.07
.43

.16
-.13

-.07

.32
.04

.04
.17

.19
.38

.22
.03

-.OS
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B. Political Issue Preference
The respondents of this survey, in general, are more interested
in the political issues about their native homeland than the issues
facing America; more about Korean politicians than American politicians; and less about Korean-American power building in the U.S. than in
influencing the politics in their homeland (Table VII.8).

However,

the naturalized citizens are more likely to have greater interest in
American political issues, while the non-citizens are more likely to
have greater interest in Korean political issue (Table VII.8).
As to preference among liberal-conservative issues, interest in
liberal issues prevails over conservative ones.

The human rights pro-

blem was rated as more important than security assistance to Korea,
while social welfare was rated as more important than defense in U.S.
domestic spending (Table VI.9).

However, in regard to minority poli-

tics in the U.S., they showed more conservative preferences.

Placing

ethnic (Korean) persons in public of fices is more important (56.0 %)
than getting help through American politicians (35.0 %) as a goal in
political participation (Table VI.10).
As the main theme of this research is on the effects of authoritarianism on political efficacy and behavior, this section explores
how authoritarianism and political efficacy are related to the preference among political issues, with the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: In the choices among political issues, the authoritarian and politically less-competent respondents exhibit significantly different emphases than their less-authoritarian and more
politically competent counterparts. The authoritarian/less-competent respondents are more likely to prefer basic needs-oriented and
homeland-oriented political issues.
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Table VI.8. Issue Preference in Political Discussions
Issues
Great
U.S. Political Issues
Korean-American Power
U.S. Politicians
Korean Political Issues
Korean Politicians
Influence Korean Politics

degree of interest (%)
Somewhat Almost none

35.3
22.2
19.8
45.5
31.2
25.1

47.8
34.1
53.9
38.8
43.1
32.9

Missing

13.4
41.1
21.9
12.8
23.6
39.4

3.5
2.6
3.5
2.7
2.1
3.6

Table VI.9. Political Issue Preferences by Citizenship
(per cent of "great interest" expressed )
Issues

Citizens

U.S. Political Issues
Korean-American Power
American Politicians
Korean Political Issues
Korean Politicians
Influence Korean Politics

46.9
24.9
27.9
42.3
26.6
22.7

Noncitizens

Row Total
N = 113
69
65
137
97
76

23.3
18.7
12.8
46.7
36.8
26.7

Table.VI.IO. Government Policy Preference (in Per cent)
U.S. Policy on Korea
Aids and Security
Human Rights
No Answer
Sub Total

42.0
50.1
8.9
101.0

U.S. Domestic Policy
Social Welfare
Defense
No Answer
Sub Total

67.3
23.0
9.7
101.0

Goals of Minority Participation in Politics
Positions (Placement of Koreans)
Help through American Politicians
No Answer
Sub Total

56.0
35.0
9.0
100.0
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1. Authoritarianism and American Political Issues
Three American political issue items were added to make up the
American Political Issue Index, and similarly for the Korean Political
Issue Index (see Appendix I.5.a).

There is not much difference in

interest in American vs. Korean politics between the authoritarians
13
and the nonauthoritarians. Educational attainment is positively related to interests in both Korean and American political issues and
females tend to have lower interest in both issues.

Occupational and

income status is not related to political issue preference. But most
other key variables such as organizational involvement and years of
residence in this country are positively related to interest in the
American political issues but negatively to the Korean issues (Figure
14
VI.1.). As years of residence in this country increase, interest in
American politicians also increases (Gamma=.19), while interest in

Figure. VI.1. Major Variables and Political Issue Preferences (Gammas)
Korean Issues

American Issues

vs.
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.26
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-.27

Years Lived

.22
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.40
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"

<----

-.12

Organization

.27
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II

<---

-.22

English Use

.29

------>

"

<----

-.01

Authoritarian .09

---->

"
"
"

Negative

<-----

-.12

Positive

<-----

.13

Negative

<-----

"
"

Sex
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Korean politicians decreases (Gamma= -.20) as does influencing Korean
politics (Gamma= -.18).
efficacy.

Language proficiency is related to political

Those less fluent in English are less interested in U.S.

politics (Gamma=.29) and in American politicians (Gamma=.15), but are
15
more interested in Korean politicians (Gamma= -.22).
a. System Affect and Interest in Political Issues
System affect shows a positive relationship with American political issue preferences both among the authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in the following patterns.

Patterns (i) and (ii) support

Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11):

Table.VI.11. Authoritarianism, Political Affect, and Issue Preference
(Gammas)
American Political Issues
System
Liberal
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians
Conservative
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians

Political Affect
Civic
Input

Output

.22
.14

.60
.22

.20
.11

-.15
.05

.12
.24

.31
.32

.33
.16

.10
.04

.19
.08

-.07
.11

-.48
-.28

.06
-.05

-.38
-.08

-.21
-.29

.02
-.04

-.16
-.05

Korean Political issues
Liberal
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians
Conservative
Nonauthoritarians
Authoritarians

i) Authoritarians, both liberals (Gamma=.14) and conservatives (Gamma =.24) are likely to have a high interest in American
political issues if they have a high system affect.
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ii) Even the conservative authoritarians and also conservative nonauthoritarians are less likely to prefer Korean political
issues if they have a high system affect.
iii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with a high system affect are
slightly more likely to have interest in Korean politics than
those who have a low system affect.
b. Civic Affect and Interest in Political Issues
Civic affect is strongly related to interest in American political issues among authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

Both of the

following patterns support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.11):
i) Authoritarians both on liberal (Gamma=.22) and conservative (Gamma =. 32) sides are more likely to have high interest in
American political issues if they have a high civic affect.
ii) Except for liberal nonauthoritarians, those with lower
civic affect are more likely to have interest in Korean politics.
Especially, conservative authoritarians are more likely to prefer
Korean issues if their civic affect is low (Gamma= -.29).
c. Input Affect and Interest in Political Issues
Most respondents with high input affect expressed more interest
in American and less in interest Korean political issues as hypothesized.

In other words, if their input affect is low, both liberal and

conservative authoritarians are not likely to have much interest in
16
American political issues, in the following patterns (Table VI.11):
i) For most of the respondents, input affect is negatively
related to interest in Korean political issues, except among conservative nonauthoritarians.
ii) Authoritarians with low input affect, both liberal (Gamma
= -.28) and conservative (Gamma= -.04) are more likely to have
higher interest in Korean politics than their counterparts with
high input affect.
The above patterns show that, in the case of input affect, Korean
vs. American issue preferences clearly coincide with the hypothesized
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direction.
d. Output Affect and Interest in Political Issues
With output affect, the hypothesized relationship appears among
most of the respondents, although the strength of relationships is
very weak (Table VI.11):
i) Except for the liberal nonauthoritarians, most respondents with high output affect are more likely to prefer American
political issues; but those with low output affect are more likely
to prefer Korean political issues.
ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians with high output affect have
less interest in American political issues (Gamma= -.15), but
more interest in Korean political issues (Gamma=.06).
Thus, in the case of output affect, Hypothesis 3. is supported
among the respondents excluding liberal nonauthoritarians.
2. Authoritarianism and Liberal/Conservative Issue Preferences
There is another point of concern whether authoritarianism and
political efficacy have any effect on preference for liberal vs. conservative political issues.
shown in Table VI.9

The responses to the six policy items

made up the Political Issue Index (Table VI.12)

so that on a continuum of the index, the lower values represent liberal issue preference and the higher values represent conservative choices (Appendix I.S.b).
The utility of the Liberal/Conservative Issue index is limited
because some of the items do not precisely measure the traditional
liberal vs. conservative issue preferences as far as the Korean immigrants are concerned.

Particularly, social welfare spending by the

U.S. government cannot be considered as a liberal issue but rather
should be considered as a conservative issue, because many Korean
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immigrants are linked to this as beneficiaries. It does not mean that
a high proportion of Korean immigrants are direct welfare recipients
but rather that a good proportion of medical doctors and small-business owners depend on clients whose disposable income is primarily
derived from the social welfare budget.
When welfare spending is counted as one of conservative issues,
the Issue Index shows sensible relationships with other variables.
Therefore, in the

c~rrent

analysis, the concept of conservative issues

should be considered rather as self-preserving ones, while liberal
17
issues as altruistic ones.

Table VI.12 .Authoritarianism and Liberal-Conservative Issues ( % )

Liberal 1

Issue
2

Index
3

4 Conservative

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

20.8
16.0

39.6
45.3

37.7
29.2

1.9
9.4

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

20.5
15.9

33.3
36.2

41.0
37.7

5.1
10.1

(N =

53)
(N = 106)

(N = 39)
(N = 69)

Missing cases=77 / Gamma=.09

There is a trend that authoritarians, overall, are slightly more
likely to prefer conservative issues (mean issue score 2.35 vs. 2.24)
but the differences between the two groups are minimal (Gamma=.08).
When liberal/conservative dimensions of authoritarianism is controlled,
the following patterns appear:
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i) Authoritarians have higher mean issue scores than nonauthoritarians among the liberals (2.31 vs. 2.19) and also among
the conservatives (2.43 vs. 2.32).
ii) The conservatives have a little higher issue score than
the liberals (2.39 vs. 2.27).
Although the differences in mean issue scores are small, the
above patterns support the hypothesized relationship. And a small but
consistent pattern can also be found in the frequency distribution
(Table VI.12).

The effect of organizational involvement on conser-

vative/liberal issue preference is very weak (Gamma= -.03), although
the sign indicates that organizational members are more likely to prefer liberal issues.
a. System Affect and Issue Index
Respondents with high system affect are more likely to prefer
conservative issues regardless of whether they are authoritarians or
not.

Thus the following patterns are opposite to the predicted rela-

tionship and Hypothesis 3 is not supported (Table VI.13):
i) Among the liberals, the strength of relationship between
system affect and Issue Index is slightly stronger for nonauthoritarians (Gamma=.34) than authoritarians (Gamma=.19).
ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians (GaIIlllla=.16)
are not much different from authoritarians (GaIIlllla=.17) in the
relationship between system affect and Issue Index.
b. Civic Affect and Issue Index
There are some mixed responses with civic affect.

The following

pattern i) contradict Hypothesis 3, while ii) weakly support Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):
i) High civic affect is related to the preference for conservative issues among conservative authoritarians (Gamma=.12).
Same trend was found among liberal nonauthoritarians(Gamma=.20).
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ii) Among conservative nonauthoritarians, low civic affect
is related to preference for conservative issues (Gamma= -.06).
A similar trend was found for liberal authoritarians (Gamma=-.11).
c. Input Affect
Clearer patterns were found with input affect for most of the
respondents, supporting Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):
i) All authoritarian respondents with low input affect showed
more preference for conservative issues (Gamma= -.22 for liberals
and -.19 for conservatives).
ii) The above trend was also found with conservative nonauthoritarians (Gamma= -.16), but not with the liberal nonauthoritarians (Gamma=.04).
d. Output Affect
Only nonauthoritarians with low output affect responded in the
direction of Hypothesis 3 (see Table VI.13):
i) Liberal nonauthoritarians are more likely to choose liberal issues if their output affect is high than liberal authoritarians (Gamma= -.18) if their output affect is high.
ii) Among the conservatives, nonauthoritarians are, again,
more likely to choose liberal issues (Gamma= -.34) if their output affect is high, than are authoritarians (Gamma= -.34).

Table .VI.13. Political Affect, and Liberal/Conservative
Political Issue Index
Political Affect (Gammas)
System
Civic
Input

Output

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

.33
.19

.20
-.11

.04
-.22

-.18
.02

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

.16
.17

-.04
.12

-.16
-.19

-.34
.01
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In the above patterns, both liberal and conservative authori-

tarians are not likely to show their responses in the hypothesized
direction.

So Hypothesis 3 has no been supported in the case of out-

put affect.
Summary
Although Korean-Americans are one of the new immigrant groups,
the rate of their naturalization to U.S. citizenship and voter registration is higher than for Hispanics.

Voting rate is positively rel-

ated to educational attainment and years of residence in this country.
Organizational involvement increases political efficacy and political
participation (protest activities as well as voting). These findings
indicate that the Korean-Americans' future in political participation
will be very active.
Authoritarians, both liberal and conservative, would be most
protest-prone if they had high civic affect. In other words, authoritarians who perform their civic duty with a great sense of satisfaction
are also most likely to protest against improper governmental performance.

The profiles of protest-prone authoritarian subjects can be sum-

marized as shown in Figure VI.I.
Hypothesis 2 was fully supported by input affect, partially by
system affect(for liberals) and output affect (for conservatives) but
not by civic affect.
In the choices of political issues, the respondents generally
expressed more concerns with their homeland politics than American
politics.

However, the naturalized citizens definitely showed· more
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Figure VI.2. Profiles of the Protest Prone Authoritarians
Ll.berals
High System Affect

------>>

High Civic Affect

--------->>

Low Input Affect

------>>

Low Output Affect

-------->>

High Civic Affect

------->>

High Input Affect

-------->>

Highly Protest Prone

"
"
"

Conservative
Highly Protest Prone

"

interest in politics in America than in homeland and the years of
sojourn in this country are positively related to this trend, indicating that a slow political assimilation is taking place among this
immigrant group.

Organizational involvement and competence in English

usage seem to be two other major variables in their political assimilation; they are positively related to the preference for American
political issues but negatively to Korean political issues.
Besides these variables, authoritarianism alone has not much
effect on the choices among political issues either in their homeland or in the U.S.

But if the conservative/liberal dimension is

added, some recognizable patterns appear.

Generally, authoritarians

with high political efficacy seem to be more politically assimilated.
But the liberal nonauthoritarians who have high expectations in regard
to the government (high system and output affect) and low subjective
efficacy (low civic and input affect), tend to show more interest in
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Korean political issues.
In regard to preference for liberal vs. conservative political
issues, authoritarians showed more preference for conservative issues
than nonauthoritarians as hypothesized.

High system affect is related

to preferring conservative issues regardless of authoritarianism.

All

authoritarians with low input affect preferred more conservative issues,
while nonauthoritarians with high output affect preferred more liberal
issues.

These patterns generally support Hypothesis 3.

But no clear

pattern can be established with civic affect.

NOTES
1. Citizenship acquisition among immigrants from selected countries and regions: 1971-1980 totals and percentage of total immigrants.

Cuba

Mexico

178,374

68,152

12%

5%

Canada

W. Europe

Asia

40,843

130,380

371,683

473,754

3%

9%

25%

32%

S. America

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1980.

2. The Political Participation Index is significantly related
to the years of residence in the U.S. (Gamma=.58), to U.S. citizenship
(Gamma=.80), to educational attainment (Gamma=.35), and also to organizational membership (Gamma=.31).
3. The voting rates in the 1980 U.S. presidential election by
race are 58% for Whites, 45% for Blacks, and 38% for Hispanics (Abramson et al., 1982. p.80), although the voting rates in the off-year con-
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gressional elections have been about 5% lower than in the presidential elections through the 60s and 70s (Presidential Commission for
National Agenda for the Eighties, 1981).
Hispanic voter registration rates among eligible voters were
53.6% in 1980 and 51% in 1982 (Pachon, 1985. p.247).
4. The relationship between authoritarianism and voting is very
weak (Gamma=.01 for congressional and .08 for local elections).
Voting in the congressional election is positively related to educational attainment (Gamma=.57) and years of residence in the U.S.
(Gamma=.40), weakly to income (Gamma=.11). Apparently white-collar
job holders are more active in voting than blue-collar workers and
others (Gamma= -.33). While 75% of professionals, 63.2% of technical workers, 57.1% of clerical workers, and 48.5% of managerials
voted in the congressional election, the voting rate of unskilled
factory workers was 38.6%. Females tended to be less active voters
(Gamma= -.42). About one-third (35.0%) of female citizens and 57.4
% of males voted in the 1982 congressional election.
5. The females' voting rate is lower than males' (42.6 % vs.
28.3 % ;Gamma= -.29). Educational attainment is also positively related to voting in the local election (Gamma=.44); blue-collar workers
voted less than white-collars (Gamma= -.21). Income had almost no relationship to voting (Gamma= -.04); years of residence in this country
had a positive relationship (Gamma=.14).
6. In the congressional election, one half of the high system
affect group (50.5%) and 38 per cent of the moderate system affect
group voted while only one member of the low system affect group
voted. In the local election, 45.7% of the high system affect
group and 29.1% of moderate system affect group of the citizens
voted, while only one person of the low system affect group voted.
7. The voting rate in the congressional election is higher with
the high civic affect group (69%) than with the moderate civic affect
group (47.6%), while only on person among the low civic group voted.
But the voting rates in the local election are not much different
between the high civic affect group (52.4%) and the moderate civic
affect group (54.8%).
8. In the congressional election, 61.7% of the high input
affect group and 48.7% of the moderate input affect group voted,
while 45.8% of the low input affect group did. In the local election,
voting rates were lower and the group differences are small; 47.8% of
the high input affect group and 36% of the moderate input affect group
voted, while 37.5% of the low input affect group did.
9. In the congressional election the voting rates of the high
output affect group (54.4%) and those of the moderate output affect
group (55%) were not much different, while the low output affect group
had a slightly lower voting rate (44.4%). In the local election, those
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with higher output affect had higher voting rate (52.9%) than those
with moderate (46.2%) and low (32.6%) output affect.
10. The current study used protest approval measurement only,
while the five nations studies used protest approval and protest intention measures. However, the intercorrelations between the protest
approval and intention ("might do protest") measures were very high
(average r=.53, lowest r=.45 among Austrians and highest r =67. among
Americans).
11. Marsh and Kasse (1979) analyzed the data collected in 1974
by a joint project, initially from five nations (Germany, the U.S.,
Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria). The approval rates of protest
activities by the Koreans can be compared with the highest approval
rates among the Western national samples as follows:
* Petitions - Koreans' (58.1%) approval rate is twice higher
than of the British (23%).
*Boycotts - most approved by the Americans (26%), but 44.3 %
of the Korean respondents approved disobeying the unjust government.
*Demonstrations - 33% by the Austrians vs. 32.1% by the Koreans;
both much higher than by the Americans (21%).
* Violent form of protests - the Koreans followed very closely
(27.9%) the Dutch (31%); Americans showed less approval (20%).
12. Females had lower protest potential than did males (Gamma
= -.29), while better-educated respondents were more likely to approve
protest activities (Gamma=.25). Although occupational status does not
have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, professionals were
less likely to approve protest activities than were blue-collar workers.
Also age did not have a linear relationship with the Protest Index, but
those in their 20's were more protest prone than any other age grouping:
approval of protest activities by age; 20's 50%, 30's 34.8 %, 40's
39 %, 50's and older 40 %. Length of residence in the U.S. had little
relationship with protest potential (Gamma=.01), but U.S. citizenship
had some effect on this (Gamma=.13).
13. Authoritarians are slightly more interested in Korean politics than nonauthoritarians; 40.6 % of nonauthoritarians and 44.6 %
of the authoritarians have great interest in Korean politics.
14. More than than half (55.2 %) of those who have lived less
than five years in this country have great interest in Korean politics, while that proportion is 43.3 % for the 5 -10 years group and
26.6 % for those who lived over ten years in this country. The U.S.
citizens are less interested in Korean politics than resident aliens
(Gamma= -.21).
15. Only one-third of the respondents can communicate well in
English (12.5 % speak fluently and 23.0% well).
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16. All respondents who have high input affect are more likely
to have high interest in American political issues, even authoritarians both liberal (Gamma=.11) and conservative (Gamma=.16).
17. Women are more likely to prefer conservative issues (Gamma=.25)
and better-educated respondents are less likely to choose conservative
issues (Gamma= -.21). The Liberal-Conservative Issue Index is negatively related to years of residence in this country (Gamma= -.11) and
citizenship (Gamma= -.OS). Those who have lived here longer are more
likely to choose liberal issues.

CHAPTER

VII

DISCUSSION
A. General Findings About Authoritarianism and
Its Political Implications
The Korean respondents expressed higher authoritarianism than
Americans in traits of aggression, submissiveness, and anti-egalitarianism.

However, the Koreans' preferences for egalitarianism and

openness to new ideas were much higher than expected.

It is interes-

ting to find that authoritarian submissiveness and aggression are
correlated positively with egalitarianism and openness to new ideas.
Although some of the relationships were statistically insignificant, major findings confirmed the direction of relationships between
authoritarianism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect.
The findings indicate that the liberal authoritarians are the predominant population in Korean political activism (34 per cent) rather than
the conservative authoritarians (22 per cent), whom the original writers were concerned about (Adorno, et al., 1950), or than non authoritarians.
One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a
causal sequence between organizational involvement and political competence.

At the beginning of this research, there was a question

whether the effect of personal competence as the result of childhood
socialization precedes one's organizational involvement, or whether
100
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organizational involvement in a later stage in life has the greater
effect on political efficacy.

The writer has been unable to resolve

this question with the current data, because regression analyses for
the path model failed to present any significant equations.
Authoritarianism is associated with social class variables in
the current data and social class variables have stronger explanatory
power than authoritarianism does in the relationship with political
efficacy and participation variables.
These findings and the unresolved questions with authoritarianism and political efficacy lead to the question of other covariates,
such as social class variables and the political culture unique to
Koreans.
There is also a conceptual problem than a problem of method
or data.

The writer's assumption has followed predominantly Freudian

explanation of the genesis of authoritarianism, emphasizing the results of early childhood socialization.

But the authoritarian charac-

ters attributed to psychological traits also reflect cultural values.
In Marxian explanation, authoritarianism is the internalized cultural
values and the harnessed human energy being molded to meet the social
structure and role requirements (Greenstein, 1965, p.267).

These

arguments are not resolved and the current writer had no intetion to
tangle with this conceptual problem with his limited data.
Christie and Cook, citing that highly educated individuals prefer general liberality of social outlook, argued that "F-scale is a
measure of social sophistication to a much greater extent than originally intended" by the authors of the "authoritarian personality."

And
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F-scale is most meaningful when employed in middle-class sample but
uncertain with working class sample (1958, p.176).

They argued that

"In broad terms authoritarian syndrome reflects adherence to values
which run counter to those accepted by liberal and literate citizens
of the U.S." (1958, p.188).
But the writer does not concede that the utility of F-scale is
limited to measuring American cultural values.

If a modified F-scale

have failed to measure the psychological traits of the Korean respondents, then, it is possible that certain cultural factors have prevented psychological traits from detection.

And there should be a search

for alternatives.
Considering that social psychological variables (ie., political
efficacy) were found to have no significant relationship in a massive
1

sample in Korea (Kim, et al., 1980), current findings may mean much
more than what they seem to.

As Kim et al. (1980) have speculated in

regard to their Korean sample, the results which even contradicted
their hypothesis might indicate that their respondents have not given
truthful answers in fear of retaliation by the government against such
opinions which are not in accordance with the goals of the government.
Political organizations in Korea depend upon government for approval
and protection even for their continued existence.

Many such organi-

zations are organized by the government itself and others are under
its formal or informal auspices, except for a few autonomous groups
such as student and Christian clubs acting in defiance of government
controls.

This remnant of homeland political culture may be still

functioning in the immigrant communities in the U.S.

103
B. A Political Culture in Transition
The dominant features in Korean political culture can be summarized in three categories as described in the Introduction to this
research.
I.Politics of Hierarchy and Deference
In Korean politics, those in leadership positions used to perceive their roles to be active commanding ones, and those on the receiving end were used to accepting their roles as blind submissive
ones.

Such attitudes and values have their roots in the traditional

religions (Shamanism, then Buddhism and Confucianism) which legitimized the totalitarian practices by the sovereign ruler.

Even Christi-

anity has been melted into the perspectives of vertical human relationships, and except for a few liberal Christian leaders the majority
of Protestant affiliates have been aligned with the established power
since President Syng Man Rhee (1948-1960) and the military ruler Chung
Hee Park (1961-1979).
Even the major newspapers are describing President Doo Whan Chun,
who took power by military coup d'etat in 1980, as Tong-chi-kwon-ja
(sovereign leader, the one who has the right to rule), and challenges
to his legitimacy have not been tolerated.
Under these circumstances, political actors cannot play the role
of allegiant participants because their political affects are constantly threatened and cannot be freely exercised in action.

The maj-

ority's choice could be either submission, revolt, or self-alienation
(with apathy).
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The political culture in such a nation could not be dominated
by the allegiant participants who present the best profile of a stable
democracy.

The political culture of a given nation is comprised of a

number of subcultures.

From a typology of political cultures (Almond

and Verba, 1963, pp. 12-42), modified types of political actors can be
derived and the respondents of the current sample can fit in as shown
in Figure VII.l.

Figure VII.l.TrEeS of Political Culture and Political Actors
(in Per cents, from Current Data)
Political Affects
System Civic
Input

Output

Allegiant Participant

high

high

high

Allegiant Subject

high

low

Alienated
Parochial Subject

low
low

high
low

N

( %)

high

10

( 3.5)

low

high

151

(52.8)

low
low

low
low

94
31

(22.9)
(10.8)

It is often argued that the political climate of Korea pushed
many Western-oriented intellectuals to emigrate to America.

It is true

that the Korean immigrants who came to the U.S. during the first decade
after implementation of the 1965 Immigration Law are highly represented
in the productive age group (29-39 years old) and among professionals
(Choy, 1979, pp. 242-43 and Hyung C. Kim, 1977, p.115).
In the current data, only 3.5 per cent of the valid cases are
allegiant participants who make up an ideal subculture for a stable
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democracy.

Half (52.8 per cent) of the respondents are allegiant-

subjects in the presence of strong leadership or system; 32.9 per
cent are alienated; and 10.8 per cent are parochial subjects.
These findings indicate that the Korean immigrants' political
orientation might not have changed much from what they used to be
before their emigration, or from what the homeland Koreans are currently holding.

With such political orientations the Korean immi-

grants seem to fall into the mixed category of the "subject-participant culture" of Almond and Verba (op.cit., pp.25f.):
In the mixed subject-participant culture a substantial part of
the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an
activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder
of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian
governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of selforientations ••• In the Western European examples of this type of
political culture - France, Germany, and Italy in the nineteenth
and present centuries - there was a characteristic pattern of
structural instability with an alternation of authoritarian and
democratic governments.
Our findings on authoritarianism, organizational involvement,
and political efficacy (Chapter V) indicate that the respondents in
the current study poses political subcultures according to the following patterns:
i) Conservatives are more parochial, more submissive, and
less alienated than liberals, making them a bit backward in political orientation.
ii) Liberal nonauthoritarians have the lowest proportions of
allegiant subjects or parochial subjects. They are more likely
to be allegiant participants with high proportion of alienated
individuals.
iii) There are no allegiant participants among liberal authoritarians, who are more likely to be allegiant subjects. When
compared to liberal nonauthoritarians, they have the same proportion of alienated and parochial respondents.
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iv) Conservative nonauthoritarians have the highest proportion of allegiant subjects and the lowest proportion of alienated
subjects.
v) Conservative authoritarians are less likely to be submissive to government authorities but are more alienated than
conservative nonauthoritarians.
Liberal nonauthoritarians seem to be the most democratic group,
while liberal authoritarians seem to be the most threatening to stable
democracy. Conservative nonauthoritarians seem to be the group most
compliant

with nondemocratic and mobilized political culture, while

their authoritarian counterparts could be more resistive.
Females are slightly more oriented as allegiant subjects but are
less parochial than males.

Age, educational attainment, and organi-

zational involvement have no linear relationship with this typology
of political orientation.

White-collar workers seem to have the most

stable political orientation among the respondents.

Blue-collar work-

ers are most likely to be allegiant subjects (60 per cent) and the
least alienated, but the most parochial, making them the most backward
group among the respondents.

Table VII.I Authoritarianism and Ti2es of Political Orientation
Types of Political Orientation
Alg-Part.
Alg-Sub. Alien.
Par-Sub.

Row Total

Liberal
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

0

45.3
54.8

37.7
37.5

7.5
7.7

99.9
100.0

( 53)
(104)

Conservative
Nonauthoritarian
Authoritarian

2.9
5.6

60.0
50.0

22.9
30.6

14.3
13.9

100.1
100.1

( 35)
( 72)

9.4

Alg-Sub: Subject
Alg-Part: Allegiant Participant
Par-Sub: Parochial Subject.Alien: Alienated Subject
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2. The Politics of Voter Mobilization
Between the two distinct models of adult political socialization, the Korean scene fits the mobilization one.

In the mobilization

model, organizational activities and voting do not grow out of citizens' psychological involvement but the citizens act either in compliance with the pressures from government or in deference to community
leaders.

The citizenship model, on the other hand, is firmly rooted

in citizens' awareness of political affairs, psychological involvement,
and their social positions (Figure VII.2 and 3).
Korea is one of the nations which have the highest voting rate
in the world.

Kim et al. (1980) found that, while the average voting

rate among 2,276 Korean respondents was 87 per cent, involvement in
any political organization was barely more than 4 per cent.

They found

that voting participation in Korea did not stem from individual citizen
political awareness, nor from any psychological involvement in politics.
Even the direct effect of holding social positions was irrelevant (1980,
p. 49).

Their evidence supported the notion of mobilized voting, many

citizens participating in voting merely in deference to government
pressure or to the wishes of community notables (Yooji).
With these two models, Kim et al. found that massive voting is
taking place predominantly among those in social positions susceptible
to mobilization, i.e. females, the old, the less educated, and rural
residents (Figure VII.2).
They argued that a transition from the mobilization model to the
democratic citizenship model is essential for a stable democracy, but
in reality they found that orily a partial transition has taken·place
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(Figure VII. 3) •
The current sample from the immigrant community in the U.S. indicates that such a transition has progressed further here than in
Korea.

Better-educated respondents, males, and white-collar job-hold-

ers are more likely to participate in voting and in other political
activities.

Also, the voting rate is highest among those aged in their

40s, followed by those in their 30s.

People older or younger than

these two groupings have a lower voting rate.

Because Korean immi-

grants primarily reside in urban areas, a rural vs. urban comparison
is not relevant.

Instead, years of residence in the U.S. make a great

difference in various attitudes and behaviors.

Specifically the vot-

Figure VII.2. Mobilized Voting Model
Social Position
sex: female
age: old
residence: rural
education: low

Psychological Involvement

Modes of Participation

low psychological involvement/high vulnerability
to mobilization

voting,
organizational
activities

Figure VII.3. Democratic Citizenship Model
Social Position

Psychological Involvement

Modes of Participation

sex: male
age: young
residence: urban
education: high

high political interest,
high efficacy, high propensity to absorb
information

active in political
discussion, campaigns,
contact with officials
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ing rate of naturalized citizens is higher among those who have lived
longer than 10 years in the U.S. than among the new citizens.
Therefore, the transitional citizenship model for Korean immigrants is characterized by high political activity (including voting)
among males, the middle-aged, the better-educated, and those who have
lived longer in the U.S. (Figure VII.4).
The Korean immigrants are undergoing a transition in their political culture through their participation in voluntary organizations
(as presented in Chapter VI), with the time factor (years of residence
in the U.S.) playing a key role.

Figure VII.4. Transitional Citizenship Model
Social Position
sex: male
age: middle-ages
education: high
longer in U.S.

Psychological Involvement
high political interest
high sense of efficacy
high propensity to absorb
information

Modes of Participation
active in
political affairs
voting

3. Elite-Mass Gap and Potential for Rebellion
The current data revealed that more Koreans approve of political
protest activities (Table VII.5) than do respondents in five Western
nations (Barnes and Kasse, 1979. p. 80).

Protest approval has an ex-

tremely high correlation with individuals' actual participation or intention toward such protest activities ("r" ranges between .72 to .92,
in the five Western nations sample).

Although the current data have
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no proper measure to relate protest approval to intended or actual
protest, the political reality in Korea supports the high protest potential in the current data as very meaningful.
In the Korean political reality, protest activities are viewed
with ambivalence.

The students' protest in 1960 was instrumental in

toppling dictator Syng Man Rhee's First Republic.

Since then, stud-

ents' protest activities have been highly valued among the liberals
in the context of the historical struggle for the independence of the
nation and resistance against foreign invasion (cf. Political Culture
in Chapter I.).
However, conservative Koreans view the students' endless protests
as a disruptive element in the nation's political and economic progress,
undermining the legitimacy of the government and the existing political
and economic system.
Koreans on both sides seem to view protest activities as a part
of transitional phenomena.

The liberals seem to assume that once the

dictatorship is removed, there will be no more need for protest activities; while the conservatives are determined not to listen to the
protesters, believing that repression can silence protesters.

Both

groups seem to expect an end to this struggle on their own terms.
Although the writer started with a main assumption that a psychological variable (authoritarian sensitivity to relative deprivation
or to structural discrepancies) could explain protest potential, he
finds more variables involved.
A number of theoretical factors of political protest seem to be
applicable in explaining the case of Korean protesters: (i) political
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and economic structures and conditions, (ii) perceived relative deprivation, (iii) expected success of rebellion despite the cost of conflict, and (iv) situations in which the dissident group has a certain
control over power sources (E. Muller, 1979. Chapter II).

All these

seem to be working together in Korea.
The current data indicate that the liberal authoritarians will
be more prone to protest if their high system and civic affect are
matched with low input and output affect; and the conservatives are
more likely to do so if their high civic and input affects are matched.
The liberals' protest potential seems to be occurring in Korea as projected from the current data.
The Korean respondents in the current sample expressed more protest potential than did those in a purely American sample (Barnes and
Kasse, 1979), although there was almost a decade's time gap between
the two samples.
For Koreans in the U.S., three of the above explanatory factors
seem applicable.

They are faced with structural discrimination; have

a strong perception of relative deprivation; and they have reached
a position where they can expect success in protest despite the cost
2

of conflict.

The only explanatory factor that may not be applicable

to the Korean-Americans' protest potential is that of group control
over power resources.

No one can predict how fast they can reach

such a position, but they are currently striving for such access.
As Barnes and Kasse argued (1979, p. 523f.), protest activities
are not merely a challenge to the fading legitimacy of the government,
nor are they just a fad of youth revolting from Oedipal urges.

Protest
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is also a form of routine political activity by the populace and will
remain a stable part of democratic political processes.

It will affect

elite positions, changing them to become less hierarchical and less
encompassing, increasing the extent of plural structure.
C. Adaptation and Political Integration
Although years of residence in the U.S. has a strong positive
association with political activities and issue preferences, that
relationship is not a linear one.

There are turning and regress po-

ints in the process of transition in political orientation and participation among the respondents in the current data.

Interestingly,

this pattern of conversion in political orientation seems to parallel
the critical stages in the respondents' cognitive inconsistency about
life in America.

The findings support the argument that the time vari-

able is not a causal

factor~~,

but rather a pervasive indicator

of the immigrants' acculturation, social assimilation and economic improvement.

The data also support the argument that the adaptation3
related factors vary in curvilinear fashion (Hurh and Kim, 1984).
1. Transition in Civic Identity
On the assumption of curvilinear relationship between the time

factor and adaptation variables, Hurh and Kim proposed a hypothetical
model of stages in the adaptation of Korean immigrants.

In their pro-

cedural model of adaptation (Figure VII.5), Korean immigrants would
4
go through the following processes (1978, pp.96-100):
i) Initial excitement and exigency of immigration; conditions
of culture shock, underemployment, language barrier, social isolation, etc. (1 to 3 years).
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ii) Resolution: exigent conditions are redressed through their
familiarity with American culture, employment, improvement in
English, and relatively stable income. Taste for material affluence, interaction with Americans, and desire for Angloconformity
may have increased. Thus, a degree of cultural assimilation may
progress as time goes on ( 3 to 8 years).
iii) Optimum point: past aspirations "in the land of opportunity" may be revitalized, hence, life satisfaction and desire for
assimilation may reach its peak (10 years).
iv) Relative deprivation: comparison of their life chances to
those of white Americans brings the Korean immigrants to face the
racial barriers in social mobility and lead to a sense of personal
inadequacy as well as institutional inadequacies (13 years).
v) Identification crisis/social marginality: the sense of
marginality follows the above stage. The question of "who am I"
is raised as an intense problem (15 years).
iv) Marginality acceptance or new identity: they may passively
accept their marginal identity as "Koreans in America" and remain
dysfunctional or create a new ethnic identity as the "Korean-Americans" by a positive coping strategy (20 years).

Figure VII.5 CRITICAL PHASES IN ADAPTATION PROCESS
Degree of Adaptation
(life satisfaction)
Perceived Status
Inconsistency

~M'l'
argina ity
Identification
Crisis

Acceptance

Resolution

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 years
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Figure VII.6 TRANSITION OF CIVIC IDENTIFICATION
BY YEARS IN THE U.S.
Proud as Korean
Proud as American
100 % 85.5

66.6
58.7
55.6
51.8

so
/
/
/

/
/
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0

+
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+
12 - 14

+
15 and over

~~~~...,,.-~--=~~~~~~~~~::--~...,,-~~.,,..,,..~....,..,,--~...,..,,,.-----

years

N = 202 : for earlier year groups per cents may not make 100,
because they exclude those who want to remain as alien residents.
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Among the current respondents, the new civic identity ("being
proud as American citizens") gradually emerges between 8 and 10 years
after immigration, coinciding with the optimum adaptation stage of
Hurh and Kim (op. cit.).

After passing through the identification

crisis (14 years after immigration), the new identity as Americans
begins to prevail as the old identity declines.

Yet they seem to find

two solutions to the identity dilemma as "Koreans in America" and as
"Korean-Americans" by 15 years after immigration, a few years earlier
than Hurh and Kim's suggestion (Table VII.2 and Figure VII.6).

Table VII.2. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Civic Identification
(Proud as "Koreans" or "American Citizens")
Years

Americans

Koreans

8.0 %

85.5 %

1 -

5

6 -

8

25.5

66.6

9 - 11

31.1

58.7

12 - 14

51.8

48.2

15 and over

55.6

44.4

Total

N = 80

N = 143

2. Transition in Political Issue Preference
For respondents in the current sample, obviously the turning
point of political issue preference arrives after 8 to 10 years following immigration (Table VII.3 and Figure VII.7).

The proportion of
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respondents with more interest in Korean politics than in American
political issues is higher up to 8 years after immigration. Then after
10 years of immigration the trend reverses; and the proportion of the
respondents interested in American political issues becomes higher.
The turning point in political interest coincides with the optimum
satisfaction stage in Hurh and Kim's model (1978, pp.96-100).

Table VII.3. Years in the U.S. and Political Issue Preferences
(% of Respondents with 11 Very Much Concern" in Political Issues)
Korean Issues

American Issues

Years
1 -

5

52.8 %

27.1 %

6 -

8

49.0

42.0

9 - 11

37.8

42.8

12 - 14

24.9

47.2

15 and over

33.3

44.4

331

325

Total N

When they go through the identification crisis, because they are
tired of the illusion of Anglo-conformity but are not yet accepted by
mainstream society, their interest in political issues seems to stumble (although it does not appear clearly in a condensed figure). After
15 years of immigration, they may remain with marginally accepted feelings, and thus, become less interested in politics whether of America
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or Korea (Table VII.3).

But the current data do not have enough cases

to make predictions beyond 15 years after immigration.

Fi ure VII.7 POLITICAL ISSUE PREFERENCE BY YEARS IN THE U.S.
(% of Respondents,
ery Much Concerned

so

%

~·~49.0
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/
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33.3
Korean
issue
(N=140)

24.9

20

years

+
0 - 5

+
6 - 8

+
9 - 11

+
12 - 14

+
15 and over

3. Transition in Voting
The first peak in voters' registrations occurs 10 years after
immigration, during the optimum adaptation stage, in Huhr and Kim's
model.

After that stage, voters' registrations stumble (although it

does not appear clearly in a condensed figure) but it seems to make
another upturn after the identification crisis.

When they perceive

status inconsistency and head for the identification crisis stage,
their interest in American political issues reaches its peak and they
actively participate in voting, probably in an attempt to overcome
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perceived institutional barriers.

The upward turn of voting rates

after that critical point (identification crisis) may indicate that
they are headed toward positive coping behavior instead of passive
acceptance of marginality, but the current data do not have enough
cases for a reliable prediction (Table VII.4 and Figure VII.8).

We

cannot be sure about voting trends after 15 years of immigration because all the available data (including the writer's data) about the
Korean immigrants are non-random, cross-sectional data.
If these critical points of issue preference, voters' registration, and voting did not occur as a result of sampling deficiency,
then there may be a significant theoretical implication for both adaptation and political theories.

Although the current data support the

rejection of a positive linear relationship between the time factor
and the progress of immigrants' adaptations, the writer feels that
relationship may not end up in a reverse U-curve either.

Hurh and

Table VII.4. Years of Residence in the U.S. and Voting
Registered Voter
Years

Voted in
Local
Congressional
Election
Election
0 %

0 %

1 -

5

16.7 %

6 -

9

40.6

26.1

29.5

10 - 11

69.7

52.3

42.2

12 - 14

77.4

60.6

41.4

15 and over

75.0

71.4

28.6

Valid Cases

= 169

(citizens only)
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Figure VII.8 VOTERS REGISTRATION AND VOTING
Registration
Congress Election
Local Election
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Kim, in their under-going research with Koreans in the Chicago area
(1986-87), are projecting an alternative upturn in morale around 15
years concurrently with acceptance of marginality, and creation of a
new identity by 20 years after immigration.

Their alternative model

seems to hypothesize a lopsided S-curve.
The current writer found somewhat different indications through
unplanned

encounter~

with Koreans who came to America for their own

professional advancement but ended up staying longer than 20 years.
Some have never given up the hope of Geum-Eui-Hwan-Hyang (returning
home in silk robes) and contributing to the homeland, if political
stability and opportunities were provided.

They may have a dual sense

of relative deprivation, in reference to American colleagues and in
reference to their cohorts in the homeland.
At the same time, there are plenty of Korean senior citizens who
are content with their lives in the U.S., primarily because of the social welfare system.

They may be content because they do not have any

more aspirations in social competition and their prjmary subsistence
is guaranteed by Uncle Sam rather than by their Hyo-Ja(loyal son) whom
they use to depend on for their subsistence in the homeland.
The existence of this relatively aged group does not allow any
simple prediction about Korean immigrants' adaptation and political
integration with the time factor.

The writer feels that adaptation

of Koreans in the U.S. might go through a series of cyclical ups and
downs without full political integration among the first generation
of Korean immigrants.

That prospect for the next generation of Korean

immigrants is even more uncertain.

Further longitudinal studies are
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needed in order to establish a clearer model of political integration
of this ilIDiligrant group.

NOTES
1. Chong Kim and his colleagues treated data, collected from
their interviews with 2,276 people in Korea during 1973-1974.
2. The indication that Koreans in Chicago have reached such a
position was demonstrated during two-month-long protest activities
during the Albany Bank incident in the fall of 1985. Mistreatment of
a Korean customer by an employee of the bank resulted in the arrest
and forced detention of that Korean male at a mental hospital. Through various organized protest activities, they gained the attention
of the mainstream media and succeeded in getting written apologies
from the president of the bank and the Superintendent of the Chicago
police department. But this "success" was a rather symbolic political
one.
3. Hurh and Kim reject the previous adaptation models which
hypothesize a positive linear relationship between years of residence
in a new country and satisfactory adaptation (such as by Milton Gordon,
Assimilation in American Life, 1964). They rather agree with arguments
that dissatisfaction in immigrants' lives can occur at certain times
after arrival (A.H. Richmond, Aspects of the Absorption and Adaptation
of Immigrants, 1974).
4. The sixth stage in Hurh and Kim's model has been revised by
the authors for their new research to be completed in 1987.

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCLUSION

A. Summary of the Findings
The current data support the general postulations in pluralism
about the positive effect of organizational involvement on political
competence and the negative relationship between authoritarianism and
political participatory behavior.
On Hypothesis 1, liberal authoritarians showed low scores on
all four political affect items as general postulations.

Organiza-

tional participation had an effect on this relationship and increased
system, civic, and input affect as hypothesized, but lowered output
affect contradicting the hypothesis.
Conservative authoritarians showed low system and civic affects
as generally postulated but showed high input and output affects opposing the postulations.

In these relationships, organizational in-

volvement increasing civic, input, and output affects as hypothesized
but lowering system affect.
On Hypothesis 2, the voting rate was high among all respondents
with high system, civic, and input affects;

but the voting rate could

not be consistently predicted with output affect.

The low or incon-

sistent voting rate associated with high output affect needs further
investigation.

It may have resulted because the high output affect

group is small in proportion or it may not have been explainable with
122
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the current data.
On Hypothesis 3,

authoritarianism itself was not much related

to preferences for Korean vs. American political issues.

Those who

have high system, civic, input, and output affects are likely to have
more interest in American political issue than Korean.

This is in the

direction of the hypothesis, although some of the relationship is not
significant.

Also on the liberal/conservative issue dimension, autho-

ritarians tend to express preferences for more basic, need-oriented
issues than for altruistic ones.

Political affects do not have a uni-

form effect in the direction of hypothesis.
Although some of the relationships were not strong, major findings confirmed the direction of the relationship between authoritarianism (either liberal or conservative) and political affect.

But it

was disappointing that the explained variances were too small in the
test of political affect items.
One of the writer's goals in this research was to determine a
causal sequence between organizational involvement and political efficacy.

He has been unable to resolve this question with the current

data, because regression analyses for a path model failed to present
any significant equation.
The findings suggest that variables involved in the adaptation
to the American culture by immigrants have much more influence than do
individual authoritarianism on their political socialization.

Educa-

tional attainment and years of residence in the U.S. are especially
the most important variables for reaching relative life satisfaction
in the adopted country and consequently in political socialization.
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Although the massive immigration of Koreans began only less than
two decades ago, the current data revealed an indication of changes in
their political attitudes and behavior.

Those who passed the optimum

adaptation stage began to be more conscious of American politics than
homeland politics and to participate more actively in voting.
The current data support a hypothesis by other researchers about
the relationship between the time factor and adaptation of the Korean
immigrants.

So far the relationship between the time factor and poli-

tical adaptation seems to be curvilinear.

However, because the time

span of the massive immigration experience of this group is so short,
it may not be safe to make a long-term prediction about its political
integration.
If the current data allow any projection as to future trends, it
can be predicted that the Korean immigrants are highly politicized in
terms of affective efficacy but this can fluctuate critically depending on their ability
racism.

to cope with social barriers associated with

For this reason, it is desirable to add cognitive and evalu-

ative dimensions of political efficacy to the study of immigrants'
political assimilation in the U.S.
Concerning the potential for a stable democracy in their homeland
(or in other nations which are in similar situations), the role of vol-.
untary organizations seems also to be encouraging.

The writer has tried

to search out the meaning of the rampantly emerging "voluntary" organizations to the Korean immigrants who were used to much more limited
experience with voluntaryism in their homeland.

Koreans in the U.S.

are joining with organizations voluntarily (without constraints by any
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authorities) in search of a sense of belonging and status (linked to
Garn-Too, a symbolic cap of high office) as argued by the writer
earlier (1978).

Whatever the motive for voluntary associations may

be, such involvement seems to contribute to political socialization.
Although the current data suggest that a considerable transition
of political culture has taken place from the mobilization model of the
homeland to one of democratic citizenship among the Korean immigrants
here, there are no available data which might explain how much of such
a transition has taken place in Korea.

This may be a major task for

future research.
The current data indicated that very few among the Korean immigrants are the ideal-typical allegiant participant, or democratic constituents.

Half of the sampled constituents are allegiant subjects

and more than one-third are alienated subjects.

Although the writer

has no comparable data on such characteristics among their homeland
contemporaries, he assumes there are no more allegiant participants
in Korea than in the immigrant community here.
If this is the case, the realization of a stable democracy seems
to be still decades away, despite a popular belief that removal of the
military dictatorship would immediately allow free democracy to bloom.
Unfortunately, such freedom may not be sufficiently exercised by the
dominant (in proportion) allegiant subjects nor be properly shielded
from the liberal-minded alienated subjects.

The considerably high

voting rate will continue regardless of any constitutional revision,
and rampant protest activities persist irrespective of the policies
of the government in Korea.

Such protest activities may even become
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more rampant with increased freedom as long as there is a big pool
of liberal, authoritarian, alienated subjects.
B. Comments on the Method and Data
There were two types of technical setbacks in this research:
(i) with measurement of key variables and (ii) with the sampling. The
most difficult problem of measurement happened with authoritarianism.
Reducing the number of authoritarianism items down to six, for the
sake of brevity, was a risk. And even expanding authoritarianism into
liberal/conservative dimensions of was rather arbitrary.

It may be

mathematically unsound to rely on such measures, but it seemed worthwhile to attempt to treat the leftist authoritarians as equal partners
of the conventional rightist authoritarians.
There may be criticism for treating cognitive traits (openness
to new ideas and egalitarian values) equally with psychic traits (aggressiveness and submissiveness).

But without breaking down the autho-

ritarian items, the writer was unable to find any logical and consistent results in determining relationships between authoritarianism and
other major variables.

The writer feels, as the result of this study,

that there should definitely be a distinction between authoritarians
on the left and on the right in future research.

It will be desirable,

to enlist additional questionnaire items to measure these dimensions
more completely.
The writer also admits that it is incomplete to measure political competence only in terms of affective orientations, leaving out
the cognitive and evaluative political orientations that the political
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culture theorists originally introduced.

But the writer finds his own

justification because the Koreans' affective orientations are stronger
than purely cognitive or evaluative ones. They characterize themselves
as the nationals of Jung (affection) and Euiree (fraternal piety).
Even limited knowledge about the affective political efficacy of Koreans (in the U.S.) may shed some light on the possibility of a stable
democracy in their homeland as well as their political assimilation in
the U.S.

Concern for research economy also made it inevitable to reduce

the number of factors and variables as much as possible.
There was also weakness in the randomness of the data. It was
impossible to estimate sampling error because an accurate number of
the population has not been attainable other than the one in the 1980
Census.

Fortunately, the demographic characteristics of the current

sample were found to be very compatible with the 1980 census data.
Despite these shortcomings, this research makes its own contribution, revealing the unknown political realities and potentials of a
new immigrant group, although it may be difficult to generalize the
findings beyond this sample.
C. Theoretical Implication and Suggestions for Further Research
1. Support for Pluralism
The findings reaffirm the general theses of pluralism, i.e.,
that participants in voluntary organizations have higher political
efficacy and participate more in voting.

Organizational involvements

by the Korean immigrants are almost purely voluntaristic and probably
more frequent than comparable activities in the homeland.

This factor
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seems to be positively functional for moving a political culture toward
the democratic citizenship model with the current respondents.
However, because very few of these immigrants' organizations are
political organizations oriented to the external community; and because
the majority of them are oriented toward ethnic concerns, it is not
clear how much in fact these organizations are contributing positively
to political acculturation.

Especially, the potential role of ethnic

organizations, in making the choice between creative identity (toward
Korean-American) or the older regressive identity (toward Koreans in
America) seems to be dubious at the point of existential dilemma.
More detailed research is desirable in order to identify what types
of organizations for this immigrant group are or will be facilitating
political assimilation vs. ethnic confinement.
2. Liberal/Conservative Authoritarians
In addition to the submission/aggression dimension of authoritarianism, a liberal/conservative dimension was added in the process
of analyzing the data.

The additional dimension was not considered

in the original design of the research but was added later for effectiveness of the analysis.

The results indicate that liberal authori-

tarians are the major active constituents in Korean politics.

Not

only that, liberal authoritarians have attitudes and behavior (or behavior potentials) distinctive from those of conservative authoritarians to whom most attention was paid previously.

With the growing

interest in nonconventional political (protest) behavior--not only in
the U.S. but also in the third world--liberal-authoritarians may become more important targets for future research.
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3. General Adaptation and Political Assimilation
The writer found that political acculturation is taking place
slowly among the Korean inunigrants, and that the critical points in the
transition coincide with certain stages in an adaptation model by Hurh
and Kim (1978).

This adaptation-stage model for Koreans has been pro-

posed by them as only a hypothetical one and has not been challenged
or supported by any other party.

The interesting coincidence between

their findings and the writer's provide support for mutual propositions.

Hurh and Kim are testing their hypothetical model a third time

currently (1987).

Their new findings can be tied to further political

acculturation research. '
Clear cut projection can not be made at this point about the extent of future acculturation and political integration among the Korean
immigrants because they have been here for only a relatively short time.
They have already perceived an immutable racial barrier and have begun
to concede that they will remain unmeltable ethnics.
At this juncture, their acculturation may progress further and
also their political integration as Korean-Americans.

But if they

passively accept their social marginality, the first generation immigrants may remain as "Koreans in America."
Under such circumstances, their high organizational activities
may serve as a functional equivalent to participation in mainstream
politics or in homeland politics, leaving the potential for further
political integration undeveloped.

As the data suggested, Koreans are

more protest-prone than the set of five Western nationals (Barnes and
Kasse, 1979).

The alienated Korean immigrants may turn into a highly
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protest-prone ethnic group with the encouragement of organizational
involvement.
However, the prospect for their second generation may be rather
different, although the majority of the Korean immigrants' children
who currently arrived at their adulthood are Korean-barns; they are
labelled as "trans-generation" (T.G.) or "l.S generation."

The "1.S

generation" do not have English language problems (of their parents'
generation) and are starting their professional careers in the mainstream occupational strata, after their superb academic achievements.
They are pressured by their parents to maintain their Korean identity and its cultural values, but they are less sensitive to issues
of homeland or Korean community.

They are not as much active as their

parents in community organizations and reluctant to express their interest in community leadership.

They subscribe more to egalitarian

values rejecting the authoritarian outlooks of the first generation.
They show stronger preferences for individualism than collectivism and
less ethno-centricity.

The U.S.-born Korean second generation are

called "banana generation" because only their skins are yellow (Koreanish) but their insides are almost white (American).
About forty per cent of the Illinois' Korean population was 19
years old or younger in 1980, according to the 1980 Census (Table IV.2
in Chapter IV).

If this trends hold on, the future Korean immigrant

community will have lower authoritarianism, higher political efficacy,
less ethno-centric associations, and less interest in homeland issues,
when the "trans-" or second generation arrive at their matured leadership.

But we cannot predict how active they will be in organizational
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and political participation.

The degree of political assimilation by

the next generation seems to be much depending on the political achievements and further designs by the first generation.
4. For Further Research
Confirming a general postulation of pluralism among the Koreans
and finding a political acculturation pattern parallel to the curvilinear adaptation model are achievements of the current research.

The

writer wishes to see further research in the following fashion and
magnitude:
a. Authoritarianism and Political Culture: More elaborated
measurements are needed for authoritarianism and political efficacy
(including cognitive and evaluative dimensions).

Comparative studies

(i) between the Koreans in the homeland and in the U.S., and (ii) between the Koreans and other newly arrived immigrant groups from less
democratic cultures can be conducted.

A nationwide study with a design

similar to the current one can be conducted in Korea or cross-culturally.

Since protest potential is becoming a more important expression

of political participation than the electoral process in many of the
less democratic countries, protest potential deserves major attention
in such studies.
b. Acculturation and Political Integration: Continuous longitudinal studies on acculturation, with more refined variables are necessary in order to determine whether new immigrant groups like the
Koreans are going to be politically integrated or remain alienated.
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APPENDIX I

MAJOR VARIABLES AND INDICES
1. Authoritarianism Index
In the original F-Scale and the SRC Election studies (1972), the
respondents were forced to say "Yes" or ''No" to the the questionnaire
items. In the current study a choice for "undecided" was added in
order to diffuse the acceptance/rejection response-set problem. The
"undecided" responses were included later in a "No" category.
Values assigned for each of the six items:
"agree"= +1,

"disagree"= -1,

"undecided"= -1

a. Addition of 4 items makes Authoritarianism Index.
item
item
item
item

1
3
5
6

(youth need discipline)
(science has limits)
(too much equality)
(take care of themselves )

-1
-1
-1
-1

0
0
0

0

1
1
1
1

The cumulative scores are divide into 2 groupings:

@- 4 to 2 •••• nonauthoritarian
@ 3, 4 •••••• authoritarian
b. Addition of 2 items make Liberalism Index.
item 2 (women in politics)
item 4 (open to new ideas)

-1
-1

0
0

1
1

The total scores are divide into 2 groupings:

@-2
•••••••• liberal
@ -1 to 2 •••• conservative
2. Organization Indices
The responses to each organization are coded with different values
as assigned in the following manner;
member only= 1, officer = 2,
membership; nonmember = 0,
participation; rarely = 0 , sometimes = 1, often = 2
a. Organization Membership Index:
The cumulative scores of the membership items are divided
into 3 groupings.
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@0 •••••• nonmember
@ 1,2 •••• menial member
@3 and over ••• active member
b. Organizational participation Index:
The cumulative scores of the participation items are divide
into 3 groupings.

@ 0 ••••• nonparticipant
@ 1 to 3 ••• moderate participant
@ 4 and over ••• active participant
c. Composite Organization Index:
The degree of membership, officership, and participation are
combined into following 5 rank index.
Composite
Org. Index 1
2
3
4

5

membership
none
yes
one
two or more
yes

participation
none
none
yes
yes
yes

officer
none
none
none
none
yes

3. Political Affect Indices
a. System Affect Index:
To determine the positive, negative or lack of feelings of the
respondents toward the general political system, the current research
drew four politically relevant items from the 10-items asked in the ICPR
questionnaire. Those are the affects toward full democratic system,
social welfare system, economic system, and advanced technology
and national strengths (Question II.15). The responses to the four
system affect items were coded as follows:
i) Degree of pride and respect for the country
very much = 3

somewhat = 2

not at all = 1

ii) The cumulative scores were divided into 3 groupings

@ 0 to 6 = low system affect
@ 7 to 10 = moderate system affect
@ 11, 12 =high system affect
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b. Civic Affect Index:
The ICPR(Almond and Verba) questionnaire measured the respondents'
feeling of obligation to country allowing multiple responses toward
10 items of civic duty. In the current study (Question II.13), the
respondents' feelings about four key civic duties (voting, paying taxes,
serving on a jury, and defending the country) were asked and coded as
follows:
i) Scores assigned

@satisfied with civic duties = 3
@do it only because it is duty = 2
@ feel somewhat annoyed = 1
Because there are so many missing case on jury and defense
items, one-third of the total sample should be excluded without an
adjustemnt. A mean value (1.5) of the four ranks of the qestionnaire
items (O + 1 + 2 + 3 = 6: 6/4 = 1.5) was assigned in the place of
missing values on jury and defense items.
ii) The cumulative scores of the four items are divide into
3 groupings.

@ 0 to 5 = low civic affect
@ 6 to 9 = moderate civic affect
@ 10 to 12 = high civic affect
c. Input Affect Index:
E.N. Muller (1979) rearranged the 6 items of the !CPR questionnaire (Variables 39 through 45) to form a scale to measure the ability
to influence government. These items ask the respondents what they
would and can do to change regulations which they consider unjust or
harmful (both at local and national levels). In the current study those
items were reduced to three items asking what they would do, how successful they think they would be, and if they ever tried to exercise
these input attempts. Two input-efficacy items (Question II.14.a & b)
were treated as follows:
i) Values assigned
••• "how much successful in input attempts?"

@ very likely = 4
@ moderately likely = 3
@ somewhat unlikely = 2 @ not at all likely = 1
••• "what do you think you could do?"

@ protest activities= 1 @ do nothing= 2 @write, organized
activities, vote =3 @ checking more than two items = 4
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ii) Scores of the two items multiplied and sorted into
3 groups.

@ 0 to 4 = low input affect
@ 6,8,9 = moderate input affect
@ 12,16 = high input affect

1
Input
Attempt

1
2
3

1
2
3

4

4

Feeling of Success
2
3
2

4

3
6

6
8

12

9

4
4
8
12
16

d. Output Affect Index:
The !CPR questionnaire has four items on output affect, asking
the respondents if they thought they would get serious attention and
equal treatment like everyone else when they presented their questions
or point of view to the government officials or police. In the current
study, two output efficacy items were used without distinction between
local and federal authorities, and made into a scale as follows:
i) Values assigned •
••• equal treatment by the authorities

@surely equal treatment = 5/ @may get equal treatment
@ it depends = 3/
@may not get equal treatment = 2
@will ignore my question = 1

=4

••• attention to your point of view

@seriously consider = 5/ @ pay some attention = 4
@ it depends = 3/ @would not say anything = 3
@ will ignore my point of view = 1
ii) Scores of the two items were multiplied and sorted into two
groups

@ 1 - 6 = low output affect
@ 8 - 15 = moderate output affect
@ 16 - 25 = high output affect
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Attention to Your Point of View
Equal
Treatment
by
Authorities

1
2
3
4
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
2
3
4
5

2
4
6
8
10

3
6
9
12
15

4
8
12
16
20

5
10
15
20
25

4. The Political Participation Indices
a. Participation in Electoral Process
The respondents' actual participation in the political processes
were originally measured with the following six items. The sum of the
scores on these six items were divided into six and the numbers below
decimal points were rounded to make up the Participation Index. However, because there were too many "did not" responses, 87.8 per
cent
of the valid responses fell into a moderate participant category, thus
limiting the utility of the index.

Six Items of Political Participation (in Per Cent)

Discussion
Rallies
Donation
Vote in 82
Vote in 83
Writing to

with Politicians
Natl' Election
Local Election
Media

Did
7.3
5.0
9.6
25.9
20.1
2.3

Did Not
71.4
78.7
73.2
64.1
64.7
73.5

Will Do
17.5
12.2
13.1
5.0
9.9
20.1

Missing
3.8
4.1
4.1
5.0
5.2
4.1

b. The Protest Index
The Protest Index was made up of the responses to the four
items, which asked if they approved of the major protest activities.
The cumulative scores on the four items were divided into four and the
numbers below decimal points were rounded:
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Frequncies on Protest Index
Protest Index
Low
Moderate
High

N

47
162
81

Per Cent
13.7 %
55.9 %
27.9 %

Four Protest Items
i) Protest Letter to the Politicians: About half of the respondents approved of writing protest letters to politicians but there
was no difference between nonauthoritarians and authoritarians.
Approval of protest lettesr has a significant positive relationship with educational attainment (Gamma=.23), and also positive relationship with the length of residence in the U.S. (Gamma=.24) and with
citizenship. White-collar workers are slightly more likely to approve
of writing protest letters than blue-collar workers (Gamma= -.11)
and women are significantly less in favor of protest letters than
men (Gamma= -.29).
ii) Demonstration and Marching: It is interesting to see that
only 28.8 % of the Korean respondents approved of political demonstrations and marches despite the common notion that the students' demonstrations have been the most effective means of expressing dissent to
the government in Korea. Student demonstrations actually overthrew
the regime of President Syng Man Rhee in 1961 and have been feared most
by the military successors in Korea.
Authoritarians in general are less in favor of demonstrations
than nonauthoritarians. About a quarter (24.4 %) of authoritarians
approved and 17.1 % disapproved. About one-third (31.2 %) of the nonauthoritarians approved demonstrating and 11.3 % disapproved.
As expected, females are less likely to approve demonstrations
than males (21.5 % vs. 32.1 %; Gamma= -.18). College educated respondents are more likely to approve of demonstrations than the high
school graduates (Gamma=.12). Blue-collar workers are more likely to
approve demonstrations than white-collar workers(Gamma= -.11), presumably because of work-site experiences of strikes or more frustration
in human relations at work. Although there are some income groupings
which approves of demonstrations more than others, there is no linear
relationship between income and approval of demonstration.
The naturalized U.S. citizens tend to approve of demonstrations
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more than do the resident aliens (Gamma=.14). Those who have lived
longer than 5 years in the U.S. are more likely to approve than those
who lived less than five years in the U.S. (Gamma= .11).
iii) Disobeying Unjust Government Actions: Disobeying an unjust law or action by government authorities is approved of by 39.5 %
of the respondents. There is a significant positive relationship between authoritarianism and disobedience (Gamma=.20). More authoritarians (44.7 %) approve of this type of protest than do nonauthoritarians
(36.7 %).
Females are less likely to approve of disobedience than do males
(32.7 % vs. 42.6 %, Gamma=-.17). College-educated respondents are more
likely to approve disobedience than the high school educated (Gamma
=.11). While the approval of disobeying is low among the clericals
(16.7 %), service workers (20.0 %), and small-business operators (28.6
%). More than 40 % of the professionals and factory workers approve
this type of protest.
Although those in the upper income brackets are less likely to
approve of disobedience, income has not a linear relationship with such
approval of disobedience. Neither years of residence in this country
nor legal status of citizenship/resident alien makes a difference on
the matter of disobeying governmental actions.
iv) Stopping Government: Less than one-fourth (24.1 %) approve
of violent actions that may stop the normal functions of the government.
Authoritarians are less likely to approve (20.1 %) than the nonauthoritarians (26.2 %).
Females are less likely to approve of violent protests than males
(Gamma= -.20). Only 16.0 % of females approve violent protests vs.
27.4 % for males. Educational attainment, occupational status, and
income have no significant relationship with approval of violent protest
nor do the years of residence in this country. However, the naturalized
U.S. citizens are more likely to approve of such protests (28.3%) than
the alien residents (19.3 %).
5. The Political Issue Index
a. Homeland vs. American Political Issue Index
Two sets of questions concerning issue preferences were asked
of the respondents. Qestion No.II.7 asked about the degree of interest
in Korean vs. American politics, and if they were involved in political
discussions as shown in Table VI.8. The sum of the three of the six
items which concern Korean politics and politicians were divided into
three categories and make up the Korean Political Issue Index, while
the other three items make up the American Politics Issue Index in
the same manner.
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Korean vs. American Political Issue Index
Row Total

Low

Moderate

High

American Issue Index

7.1

55.8

37.1

100.0 (N = 326)

Korean Issues Index

9.0

48.8

42.2

100.0 (N = 332)

b. The Liberal-Conservative Political Issues Index
Question No.II.8 aksed for the traditional liberal vs. conservative responses to the three-pair items (Table VI.10). It was not
reasonably possible to obtain clear-cut liberal vs. conservativethe
responses from the data. If they were coded into dichotomous indices
they would not be clearly correlated with liberal-conservative traits
of authoritarianism. The responses rather seem to reflect altruistic
(for the liberals) and self-preservative (for the conservatives) attitudes. At any rate they were given the status of liberal vs. conservative issue preferences. And the Liberal-Conservative Issue Index
was made up so that on a continuum the lower values represent liberalism and the higher values represent conservatism, in the following
manner:
Liberal/Conservative Issue Preference
Liberal

vs. Conservative Choices

three
two
one
none
Missing cases=54

none
one
two
three

Issue Index
1. Low (liberal)
2.
3.
4. High(Conservative)

%

16.9
41.0
33.8
8.3

APPENDIX II

CENSUS DATA AND CURRENT SAMPLE
1. Sampling Strategy and Schedule
Out of the 7,500 subscribers of the Korea Times, three typical
characteristic clusters related to the history of Korean's mobility
were initially selected as follows:
a. The inner city samples were selected from the neighborhoods
where relatively newer Korean immigrants are living. These areas are
Lakeview (zip codes 60613,60657), Uptown (zip code 60640), Rogers Park
(zip codes 60645,60659), and Albany Park (zip codes 60618,60625,60630).
b. The suburban samples were selected from (a) the near north
suburban towns such as Skokie, Morton Grove, Des Plaines, Glenview
(the first three digits of zip code is 600), (b) northwest suburbs
such as Elk Grove Village, Schaumburg area, Elmhurst (the first three
digits of zip code are 600 or 601), and (c) southern suburbs such as

Sampling Schedule
Areas

1st Wave/Returns

Chicago City
Lakeview
Rogers Park
Albany Park
Sub Total

2nd Wave

114 I 15
87 I 14
216 I 45
417

74
51
120

Total Returns (%)

28
31
51
174 (41.7%)

Suburbs
103 I 11
Near North
North West
n I 16
34
Southern
208
Sub Total
Other than Cook county suburbs
Chicago Area Total

3rd Wave

87
42
22

0
0
0

35
31
11
77
16

(34.0%)
(43.7%)
(32.3%)
(37.7%)

268 (42.9%)
Analyzable cases 242(38.8%)

625 :

Neighboring States(one batch/returns)
Ind. 81 I 23;
Ga. 54 I 17;
Minn. 58 I 15; Mo. 73 I 18;
Sub Total 452 I 128:

Mich. 104 I 31;
Wis. 82 I 24.
128 (28.3%)
Analyzable cases 102(22.6%)
396 out of 1,077

Total Return
156

(36.8%)
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Hindsdale, Downers Grove, Palos Heights, and Lombard (the first three
digits of zip code are 604 or 605).
c. Four neighboring states and Georgia were included in the
survey because the Koreans in these states share the sense of community with Chicago's Koreans by subscribing for the same newspaper
and share similar social characteristics.
2. Census Data and Current Sample
According to the 1980 census, the median age of the KoreanAmerican population in the country (total 354,593) is 26.1 years and
26.9 years in Illinois (total 24,351). The median age of current
sample is 40.0 years because the sample was drawn from adult population (over 20 years old) while the census includes persons under 19
years old. But when only the persons over age 20 considered, the TTest shows that the mean age of the Koreans in census is not significantly different from that of the current sample (F=6.99; with d.f. 1
and 10; 0.05 < p < 0.01).
The educational achievement status is a little difficult to
compare because the junior and senior high school systems are not
identical between the two countries and the measurements are organized differently in the census and current survey. The T-Test after
adjusting the measurement of the current survey into four categories,
compatible with the census measurement (Table II. 2) shows that the
mean education scores of the two groups are different (F=18.84: with
d.f. 1 and 6; p < 0.01). The frequency distributions indicate that
under-educated people are counted more in the census than in most of
Korean community surveys, which usually show that two-thirds of the
Korean immigrants are college graduates.
However, when the educational achievement categories are collapsed into two (high school graduates or under vs. college educated)
the there remains no difference between the census population and
the current sample (F=16.68; with d.f. 2 and 1; 0.05 < p < 0.01 ).
It may be said that Korean community surveys draw more responses from
highly educated people, however, the basic constituency is not significantly different in terms of educational achievement.
The comparison of occupational status does not show that the
current sample represent the census population with statistical
significance (see Tables II.5 & II.6). The census has more representation from factory workers than the current sample (skilled and nonskilled workers 22.7 % vs. 6.1 %), while the ratio of self-employed
proprietors is reversed (6.2 % vs. 17.4 %). Also the proportion of
white collar job holders decreases from 1980 Census (33.5 %) to current sample (29.7 %). However, if the occupational categories are
collapsed into three (white-collars vs. others, and unemployed) the
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group difference disappears (F=0.57; with d.f. 1 and 4: p < 0.01).
The income status needs no comparison because the average income (combined gross annual household income) of the current sample far exceeds
that of the Koreans in the census ($35,788 vs. $22,833).
To sum up, the current sample shares identical characteristics
in age and educational achievements with the Illinois' Koreans. And
the proportion of white-collar workers and unemployed are very close.
Considering the three-and-half years time gap between the two sets of
data, there is no significant difference between the two groups even
though there is a considerable income gap between the two data.
3. Variance Between the Sampling Blocks
The crosstabulation of age distribution among the three clusters
indicates that the Chicago city sample has slightly more (about a dozen
more) elderly respondents than the suburban and out-of-state clusters
but Chi-square is not significant. And the T-test proves that there is
no difference in variance from the mean age between Chicago area (including suburbs) and the out-of-state samples (F=l.83 with d.f. 1 and
11; p < 0.01).
The crosstabulation of educational distribution shows that Chicago city sample has more college-educated people than the suburban
and out-of-state samples (Chi-square: significant at 0.002 level with
d.f. 14). But the T-test shows that there is no difference in variance
from the mean between Chicago area and out-of-state samples (F=l.07
with d.f. 1 and 14; p < 0.01).
The occupational characteristics are not significantly different
among the three cluster samples although the suburban sample has a
slightly higher proportion of technical level professionals and small

Table.A.II.I. Age ComQarison by SamQling Blocks
( in per cent )
70-over

Total

3.7

0.9

107

10.4

1.5

0.0

67

9.3

6.8

2.5

162

Age

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

Block!

11.2

38.3

34.6

11.2

Block2

6.0

35.8

46.3

Block3

12.3

37.0

32.1

Sampling Blocks 1: Out of State
Missing Cases=8

2: Chicago Suburbs

3: thicago.

159
of proprietors. 1he T-test also shows that Chicago area sample and the
out-of-state sample are not different in their variances from the
mean (F=3.42; with d.f. 1 and 18; p < 0.01).
Income distribution of the three clusters are slightly different
because Chicago city sample has more people with incomes under $ 20,000
and fewer people in the above $50,000 level (however, the Chi-square
value is not significant although Gamma is -.12). Also the T-test
tells that Chicago area and out-of-state samples have different variance from the mean (F=13.64; with d.f .1 and 18; 0.05 < p ).

Table.A.II.2. Educational Attainment: Comparison by Sampling Blocks
( in per cent )
Blockl

Block2

Block3

Total

High School Graduates
or under

34.7

32.3

16.8

82

College Educated

56.4

52.3

76.7

210

Graduate Studies

8.9

15.4

6.5

29

100.0

100.0

100.0

321

Column Total
Missing Cases=23

Table.A.II.3. Occupational Comparison bx Sampling Blocks
( in per cent )

Professional
Technical
Managerial
Clerical
Skilled Worker
Non-skilled Worker
Proprietor
Service Worker
Others(Employed)
Column Total
Missing Cases=98

Blockl

Block2

Block3

Total

16.0
16.0
24.0
1.3
5.3
6.7
5.3
2.7
22.7
100.0

9.4
35.8
15.1
3.8
1.9
3.8
3.8

6.8
21.2
27.1
7.6
3.4
4.2
6.8
2.5
20.3
100.0

25
56
58
12
9
12
14
5
55
246

o.o

26.4
100.0
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The years of sojourn in this country is significantly shorter
among the Chicago city sample than the suburban and out-of-state
samples (Chi-square is significant at 0.02 level with d.f. 16 and
Gamma= -.16). Also the T-test shows that Chicago area and out-ofstate samples are different in their variances from the mean (F=6.57;
with d.f. 1 and 16; 0.05 < p < 0.01).

Table.A.II.4 Income Com2arison by Sam2ling Blocks
( in per cent )
Block!

Block2

Block3

Total

6.5

1.5

4.2

15

$ 10,000 - $ 19,999

16.7

7.5

21.8

59

$ 20,000 - $ 29,999

24.0

19.4

26.0

82

$ 30,000 - $ 39,999

13.9

20.9

17.6

58

$ 40,000 - $ 49,999

8.4

15.0

8.5

33

$ 50,000 and over

30.6

35.8

21.8

93

Column Total

100.1

100.1

99.9

340

Under $ 10,000

Missing Cases=4

APPENDIX III

~estionnaire

The

Please fill in following information about yourself (Fill in or
circle appropriate category).

SECTION I.
1 • Age: ____years old.
2. Gender: Male (

), Female (

3. Marital status: Married (

4. Legal status in

~he

).
), single (

), divorced (

), other (

)

U.S.

a. American citizen ( ), b. permanent resident ( ),
c.others (state
)
if you are a citizen have you registered for voting? Yes (

), No(

)

5. Please check your highest school grade/degree completed.
in Korea
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.
h.
i.

less than high school
some high school
high school graduated
some college attended
college graduated
some post-college works
master's degree
doctoral degree
other(state

(
(
(

(

)

)
)

(
(
(

)

)
)

(
(
(
(
(

in the U.S.

)

)
)
)
)
)

(

)
)
)

(
(
(

)

)

6. Are you currently employed?
(
(
(
(

(
(
(

) yes(specify your job title

)

employed before but,laid off
looking for work
retired
home maker
) student
) never worked
)
)
)
)

7. What was your family's approximate gross annual income (in 1982)?
·$ _ _ _ _ _ __

8. How long have you been in the States?

(

) years (

) months.

9. What is your religious affiliation?
Protestant (

)

Buddhist (
162

)

Catholic (

)

other (specify

)

.
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10. What is the major news medium that you rely on to find out how the
world is going around(rank the following types in order of greatest importance. Mark 1 for most important, 2 to for next, upto 5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

American TV
American papers
Korean language newspapers
American radios
Korean language TV or radios

(
(
(
(
(

)
)

)
)
)

11. Do you regularly read English newspapers?

Check one.

Of ten Sometimes Rarely Never
(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

12. How of ten do you listen to the radio for
(
news? Check one.

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

13. How of ten do you watch TV for news broadcasts?
Check one after each.
) (
a. national news in the early morning. (
) (
(
b. national early evening news.
(
) (
c. local early evening news.
(
) (
d. local late night news.
(
) (
e. political news specials.

)
)
)
)
)

(
(
(
(
(

)

(

)
)

(
(
(
(

)
)

*

)
)

)
)
)

There were 14 additional questions concerning newspaper readership
asked to the respondents in the first wave mailing but deleted in
later questionnnaires.

SECTION II.
1. Between Korean and English, which language do you use more frequently at home? Check one.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

always Korean only
mostly Korean with some English
about half Korean and half English
mostly English with some Korean
always English only

(
(
(
(
(

)

)
)
)
)

2. How well do you read, speak, and write in English?
each type.
fluent (1)
a. reading
b. speaking
c. writing

not at all (5)

poor (4)

fair (3)

good (2)

(
(

)
)

(
(

)

(

)

(

)

)

(

)

(

)

(

(
(

)

(

)
)

)

Check one after

(
(
(

)

)
)
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3. Are you a member of the following organizations? And have you held
any officership in the organizations? And how often do you attend
those organizational meetings?
(Check all that apply)
(Check one)
member officer
attendance
of ten sometimes rarely
( )
( )
a. provincial(homeland) organization ( ) ( ) I ( )
( )
( )
b. high school alumni
( ) ( ) I ( )
( )
( )
c. college or university alumni
( ) ( ) I ( )
d. church related organization
( ) ( ) I ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
e. service function organization
( ) ( ) I ( )
)
(
)
( )
f. professional organization
( ) ( ) I (
(
)
(
)
)
g. the Korean Association of Chicago ( ) ( ) I (
)
(
)
)
(
h. other,specify
( ) ( ) I (

________

(

) I

) (

( )

(

)

(

)

4. How many times during the past 12 months have exchanged social
visits with American friends (e.g.invite to your home or get invited to their homes)?
( )
a. once
( )
b. 2 to 5 times
( )
c. 5 to 9 times
d. ten times or more ( )
( )
e. never
5. Please, mark each of the following items showing how much you agree
or disagree with the following statements. Check one under each.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

disagree (1) undecided (2)
What young people most need
( 1
is strict parental discipline.
2
3 )
Women should stay out of politics.( 1
2
3 )
Science has its place, but there are
many important things that can
( 1
never possibly be understood.
2
3 )
People should pay attention to
new ideas even if they seem against
( 1
to what people generally think.
2
3 )
In many respects equality has
( 1
gone too far in this conutry.
2
3 )
All but the handicapped and old
( 1
should take care of themselves.
2
3 )

agree (3)

6. When you gather for organizational meetings, how often do you have
occasion to talk about politics. Check one.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

on almost all the occasions I attend
on about half of the occasions I attend
sometimes but not of ten
scarcely
never

(

)

(
(

)
)

(

)
)

(
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7. If you talk about politics at such meetings, what would you be
mostly concerned about? Check one after each.

Mark one.

would be concerned very much (1)/ not much (2)/ almost not (3)
a. current issues in American politics.
b. organizing Koreans to consolidate their powers in
America.
c. American politicians at local and national levels.
d. current issues in Korean politics.
e. who's who in the Korean politics.
f. efforts to help or influence homeland politics.
)
g. other ( list

( 1
( 1

2
2

3 )
3 )

( 1
( 1
( 1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

( 1
( 1

)
)
)
)
)

8. Of the following pairs of political issue statements, which one do
you feel easier to support? Check either (a) or (b) under each.

*In the Korean affairs the U.S.government should put emphasis on •••
a. maintaining the national security and political status than
any other needs. ( )
b. influencing the Korean government for the improvement of human
rights and democratic development. ( )

*In domestic policy, the U.S. government should spend more •••
a. on its aid to education and social welfare programs
b. on national defence and foreing military assistance

*

(
(

)
)

In the area of minority political participation, the Korean community should aim •••
a. to place Koreans in the public offices as much as possible ( )
b. support American politicians and obtain maximum access to policy
making through them ( )

9. During the past one year have you participated any of the following
activities. Mark appropriate number.

yes (1)/ no
a. attend political meetings where they have
political discussions or have politician(s)
invited.
b. attend political rallies for a candidate or
a political party.
c. donate money to a candidate or party.
d. vote in the last November election.
e. vote in the April local election.
g. write an opinion letter to Korean newspaper

intend to (3)

(2)/
(1

2

3)

(1
(1
(1

2
2
2
2
2

3)
3)
3)
3)
3)

(1
(1
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10. 'nlere are many ways for people to show their disapproval or disagreement with government's policies and actions. Would you show
which one from below you approve/disapprove as the means for showing dissatisfaction with the U.S.government?
Mark appropriate numbers:
approve (1)/ disapprove (2)/ depends on circumstance (3)
a. writing letters of protest to politicians.
b. protest meetings and marches permitted
by local authorities(such as the protest
against education budget cuts).
c. refusing to obey a law which one thinks
unjust, and risking to go to jail(e.g.
police brutality).
d. attempting to stop the government from its
usual activities(e.g.sit-ins, mass rallies)
after failing in other means of protest.

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)

11. If you have any preference for American political parties what
label would you identify with? Check one.
Democrats/

(

)

)

Republicans/ Independents/ others (state

(

)

(

)

12. a. Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to the
"authorities"-- for example, a tax assessment, immigration
status, or a traffic ticket by the police--, do you think you
would be given equal treatment, as well as anyone else?
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)

They surely will give me equal treatment.
I may get equal treatment.
They will ignore my questions •
It depends.
I may not get equal treatment.

b. If You explained your point of view to the officials what effect
do you think it would have?
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)

they will seriously consider
they will pay some attention
they will ignore my point of view
it depends
they would not say anything

13. How close are these statements to describe your feelings about
performing following citizens' duties?
feel worthwile (1)/ do it only because it is duty (2)/
feel somewhat annoyed (3)
a. when

you pay taxes.

(

1

2

3 )
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b. when you have to go to vote.
c. if you were asked by a court to serve
on a jury.
d. if you(or your son) are asked to register
for draft.

(

1

2

3 )

(

1

2

3 )

(

1

2

3 )

14. Suppose a regulation is being considered by the city council or
the legislatures of the state or congress, and that you considered
it very unjust or harmful(e.g. mandating every household to own a
handgun), what do you think you could do?
a. Check all that you may do.

(
(
(
(
(

(

)
)
)
)
)

probably do nothing.
write or talk to politicians(alderman or congressman etc.)
work through organized groups
express opinion by voting.
take some protest activities, such as sit-ins, march, or
some violent actions if necessary.
) simply disobey

b. If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely
is it that you would succeed. Check one.
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

very likely
moderately likely
somewhat unlikely
not at all likely

c. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a political
(local, state, and federal) decision? Check one.
(
(
(

) of ten
) once or twice, a few times
) never

15. Speaking about America, the new country you are living in, what
aspects gives you the most pride and respect for the country?
Mark the degree of pride you feel with apropriate numbers.
Very much (1)/ somewhat (2)/ not at all (3)
a. democratic system which guarantees
equality and justice for all
b. social legislation which provides
basic welfare for all
c. economic system which provides chance
for everyone to make living
d. its industrial, technological, and
military strength

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)

( 1

2

3

)
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16. Are you proud of yourself for becoming an American citizen or
a permanent resident? Check one.
(
(
(
(
(

*

)
)
)
)
)

I'm proud of becoming a citizen
I'm proud of becoming a permanent resident
I'd rather be proud of being a Korean
I am not sure about which identity I should proud of
don't know

Three more items were asked for suggestions to the Korea Times and

1. If you have any suggestions to the Korea Times, please, fill in the
following space.
2. Is your newpaper delivered on time?
(
(

) yes
) it misses

--- times a week

3. Your postal zip code

-------
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